Notre Dame Law Review
Volume 29 | Issue 3

Article 7

5-1-1954

Recent Decisions
Larry E. Corr
John J. Malik
Richard E. Shipman
Paul R. Jackiewicz

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Larry E. Corr, John J. Malik, Richard E. Shipman & Paul R. Jackiewicz, Recent Decisions, 29 Notre Dame L. Rev. 467 (1954).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr/vol29/iss3/7

This Commentary is brought to you for free and open access by NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Notre Dame Law Review by an
authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu.

RECENT DECISIONS
It is true that whenever the court grants a legal monopoly it must be
wary of stifling the interests of the public. Conversely, serious consideration must be given to the fact that ruthless, unfair competition sans legal
intervention in a field that is already restricted as to numbers of competitors through legislative action would be detrimental to the public
in that it (the public) would be subjected to repetitive non-creative programs at the whim of competing telecasters. This latter interest should
share the balance with the actual conflict resulting in unfair competition
between the rival agencies. If unfair trade practices have been recognized
on a national scale by the Congress,53 it would seem that courts should
be competent to award relief on a worthy set of. facts when the unfair
competition is taking place within a business that is saturated with the
public interest.
Robert D. LeMense
Wilbur L. Pollard

RECENT DECISIONS
ENFORCEABILITY OF A BAIL BOND ISSUED WITHOUT AUTHOR- People v. Wirtschafter, 305 N.Y. 515, 114 N.E.2d 18 (1953).
This case involved the validity of a bail bond issued to a second felony
offender contrary to statute. Wirtschafter was convicted for the second
time in 1943. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction and Wirtschafter obtained a certificate of reasonable doubt. The certificate directed that he be admitted to bail contrary to N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC.
§§ 552, 555, which forbade the release qf a second felony offender even
when a stay in the proceedings has been obtained by certificate. A surety
company met the bond and the prisoner, released, absconded. A forfeiture of the bond was entered and an ex partM order obtained to authorize a judgment on the bond. The surety then moved for an order vacating
the judgment, declaring the bond void, and for what other relief might
be appropriate because the granting of bail was without the law. That
motion was accepted by neither the county court nor the Appellate
Division, but the Court of Appeals agreed with the surety. It held that
the bail bond was granted without authority, that it was invalid as a
statutory recognizance, and that it was void for all purposes. It was
further held that the bond was not enforceable as a common-law obligation and that the surety was not estopped from denying liability inasmuch as the State, as well as the surety, acted wrongfully in directing
the bail and that if it were to win the forfeiture it would be benefiting
from its own wrongdoing.
The dissenting opinion concerned itself with the question of public
policy: the primary purpose of a bail bond is to insure the appearance
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of the prisoner in court, and anything that causes a surety to relax in
the effort to bring about that end is against public policy.
The majority in this case based its decision upon a series of cases, e.g.,
State v. Ricciardi, 81 N.H. 223, 123 Atl. 606 (1924), which hold that a
bail bond given when the crime is such that the court has no power to
bail is a nullity. Such a rule is almost universally accepted, as the
citations in the majority opinion show, 34 A.L.R. 612 (1925), 8 C.J.S.,
Bail, § 43 (1938). Contra, Jones v. Gordon, 82 Ga. 570, 9 S.E. 782
(1889). In Bongiovanni v. Ward, 50 F. Supp. 3 (D. Mass. 1943), it was
held that where a bail bond is issued without authority the surety is not
estopped from denying its validity. It becomes necessary, then, to find
another stronger reason eclipsing this if support is sought for the dissenting opinion.
This other reason is claimed to be public policy. There are cases holding that right of recovery by a surety against the principal will not be
implied on a criminal bond, United States v. Ryder, 110 U.S. 729
(1884), Ewing v. United States, 240 Fed. 241, 252 (6th Cir. 1917),
Littleton v. State, 46 Ark. 413, 418 (1885). These are principal cases
holding, generally, that public policy requires sureties to be first concerned with seeing the released prisoner in court at the proper time and
that the incentive to the sureties to do this lies in the possibility that
they may lose money through a forfeiture of the bond if they, in their
capacity of jailor, fail to present the prisoner. Contra: Badolato v.
Molinari, 106 Misc. 342, 174 N.Y.Supp. 512 (Sup. Ct. 1919).
The general rule holds that no implied contract will exist, but there
have been cases enforcing express contracts for the indemnification of a
surety for losses sustained on a bail bond. Leary v. United States, 224
U.S. 567 (1912), stated that it was not against public policy to have an
express agreement to indemnify the surety in a bail bond. In Calamitav.
DePonte, 122 Conn. 20, 187 AtI. 129 (1936), the defendant, who was
not the prisoner, promised to indemnify the plaintiff surety. Therein lies
another distinguishing feature from the Ryder and Ewing cases, supra,
in which the person against whom recovery was sought was the principal.
As a practical matter it makes little difference who indemnifies the
surety. Under the theory of public policy the effect on the surety should
be identical regardless of the source of the money. Cf. Moloney v. Nelson, 158 N.Y. 351, 53 N.E. 31 (1899), in which agreements to indemnify
signers of bail bonds are upheld as not against the public policy of the
State which in fact via statute allowed a deposit of money, bonds, notes,
etc. in lieu of bail. And in Carr v. Davis, 64 W. Va. 522, 63 S.E. 326
(1909), the defendant who promised indemnity was again not the principal. There the court went on to say that implied promises are not
recognized because they would be opposed to public policy, but that an
express promise is different because, if collusion were found, it could be
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declared void. But again, consider facts under which an express promise
with no collusion existed: would not the surety feel relieved of his
potential financial loss nonetheless?
From these cases is drawn the conclusion that express contracts to
indemnify the surety in bail bond cases are enforceable while implied
contracts are not. If the mere difference of express or implied contract is
permissible as a means of avoiding the public policy theory, why cannot
another means of avoiding that theory exist? That is to say that since
public policy will be contravened no less by a surety's laxity because of
an express agreement of indemnification than by implied agreement, why
cannot the public policy theory be circumvented claiming, as here, that
lack of authority in the taking of the bond makes it null and void for all
purposes? This is especially true in view of State v. Ricciardi, and
similar cases, supra.
The question of whether or not the surety company in the Wirtschajter
case is estopped from denying liability brings up the problem of pari
delicto. It is an established principle of law that one cannot take advantage of his own wrongdoing and that where the party seeking to
employ the principle of estoppel does not have clean hands he will not
succeed. Pacific Finance Corp. v. Hendley, 119 Cal. App. 697, 7 P.2d
391,395 (1932).
As was pointed out by the majority in the instant case, the state was
as wrong in permitting the bail bond to be issued as was the surety
company in giving it. The case cited by the state, McClare v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 266 N.Y. 371, 195 N.E. 15 (1935), is distinguishable inasmuch as it is based on similar but not identical facts.
There the party .seeking to benefit by the bond was the plaintiff who,
while he knew of the existence of the bond and acted in reliance on it,
did not know the circumstances by which it came into being. The state
athletic commission, which had exceeded its jurisdiction in requiring the
bond, did not benefit as would the state in the Wirtschafter case. Presumably the decision would have been otherwise had the commission
stood to benefit. The State was wrong in acting as it did; therefore, it
seems that the Court of Appeals was right, according to principles of
estoppel, in leaving the parties where they were.
As the dissenting opinion in the principal case pointed out, there was
no case or statute that would control the court in reaching its decision;
therefore, it was quite free to decide upon the broadest bases of common
law. Faced with the necessity of choosing between two applicable arguments, the court agreed with those authorities who claim that such bonds
are null and void. Although that decision may appear to ignore the
problem of public policy, that policy can be effectively abandoned under
other circumstances as well. It seems that New York followed the better
reasoning in reaching its new law.
Larry E. Corr
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CHARITABLE RESIDUARY TRUSTS - SPECIFIC BEQUESTS - CONDITION
SUBSEQUENT - CONDITION PRECEDENT. Mellott v. Mellot,-- Ohio App.

---(1953). The trustees designated in the will of James Mellott were
directed to erect a library for the city of Bellaire, Ohio, on a site to be
provided by said city which was acceptable to the trustees, with funds
from decedent's estate. After completion the library was to vest in and
become the property of a board of library trustees to be designated by
the city. If it should become necessary, the trustees were empowered to
expend all of the residuary estate for the library except one hundred
shares of First National Bank stock and all shares of stock in the Union
Savings Bank. This stock was specifically set aside for the upkeep and
repair of the building, and the trustees were given discretionary power
to pay the income to the library trustees. However, if the city of
Bellaire did not provide a site which would be suitable within ten years,
or an additional period at the option of the trustees, there was then to be
a gift over to other charitable organizations stipulated in the will.
The widow of James Mellott elected to take against the will and in
addition she wished to buy from the estate four hundred shares of Union
Savings stock. A state statute provided that she could not purchase
property that was specifically bequeathed, OHIO GEN. CODE ANN. §
10509-89 (Supp. 1952). The court of appeals held that the shares were
not specifically bequeathed since they were given on a condition precedent and no interest in the property had vested in anyone; thus it
might ultimately vest in one or more of several persons or organizations
or in none.
The question for determination is the status of property bequeathed
to trustees for a charitable purpose pending fulfillment of a condition
precedent: Is the property specifically bequeathed or does it become a
part of the general residuary fund?
The decision reached by the court of appeals is not consistent with
the usual determination involving charitable trusts. ZOLLmAN, AMERICAN
LAW OF CHARITIES § 642 (1924), expresses the liberal attitude adopted
by the courts: "Conditions which, in the case of an ordinary trust, will
be held to be conditions precedent, will, in the case of a charitable trust,
be held to be conditions subsequent." This is saying, in effect, that
although we know black to be black, we will under certain circumstances
call black white. However absurd this may sound, it is nevertheless indicative of the liberal construction put upon charitable trusts. This point
of liberality was clearly brought out in Klumpert v. Vrieland, 142 Iowa
434, 121 N.W. 34, 36 (1909), where it was said that:
In carrying into effect a legacy to an individual, the mode is deemed to
be of the substance of the legacy; but, when the legacy is to charity, the
court considers the charity as the substance, and, if the mode prescribed
shall fail, will provide another rather than allow the purpose to fail.
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There is ample authority for holding the condition in the instant case
to be subsequent. In re Nugens Estate, 223 Iowa 428, 272 N.W. 638
(1937), involved a residuary clause directing the executor to spend ten
thousand dollars for the purchase of a suitable building to be used for a
free library, conditioned, however, on the town accepting the same and
in addition furnishing all light, heat and clerical help. After erection of
the library building, all the rest and residue of the estate was to be kept
in trust and the income to be used to purchase books. The court held the
gift of the library a charitable one and construed the condition as being a
condition subsequent. Cf. Hayden v. Stoughton, 5 Pick. 528 (Mass.
1827); Smith v. Smith, 64 Neb. 563, 90 N.W. 560 (1902); Brannon v.
Mercer, 138 Tenn. 415, 198 S.W. 253 (1917); Burdis v. Burdis, 96 Va.
81, 30 S.E. 462 (1898).
The court of appeals in the instant case, however, construed the condition as being precedent. A condition precedent is a condition upon the
happening of which an estate will vest. A condition subsequent is a
condition which does not necessarily precede the vesting of the estate,
but one which may accompany or follow it. It may defeat an estate
already vested. Treating the condition as precedent, does it follow that
because of the condition the property will not vest in anyone? Does it
mean that the bequest will lose its specific nature as the court of appeals
pointed out? To answer these questions in the affirmative would be to
deny the settlor the right to dispose of his property on such terms and
conditions as he deems advisable, where to do so does not conflict with
any rule of law or public policy.
The question clearly then is whether the condition precedent attached
to the specific bequest will destroy its specific nature. In re Banfield's
Estate, 173 Ore. 256, 3 P.2d 116, 117 (1931), involved a will in which
the testatrix gave to Anna Schulderman "my Singer Sewing Machine, and
Government Bonds to the par value of One Hundred Dollars, or, one
hundred dollars in cash at the election of the executor . . ." only if she
shall reside with me at the date of my death. Another bequest was "To
my husband.., all cash on hand and bonds of the United States Government, not herein otherwise bequeathed. . . ." The court held that
though the bequest to the husband was specific, it was subject to the
terms of the conditional bequest to Anna Schulderman. It is submitted
that the bequest to Anna Schulderman was a specific one, conditioned
upon her residing with the testatrix at the time of her death. This is
clearly a condition precedent; yet the court held the bequest valid when
it made the bequest to the husband conditional upon it. Examination of
this case will reveal that what was done was to make a specific bequest
subject to the terms of a conditional, specific bequest. The bequest to
Anna Schulderman is to be distinguished from the instant case in that
there the condition was fulfilled at the time of death if at all. Her rights
were determined as of that moment and there was no suspension of
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vesting. The bequest to the husband, however, more closely parallels the
instant case. The one hundred dollars in bonds and the one hundred
dollars in cash were given subject to Anna Schulderman fulfilling her
condition, and in addition, subject to the election of the executor. The
executor was to give either the cash or bonds to Anna Schulderman;
subsequent to his election either the bonds or the cash, whichever one he
did not choose, would vest in the husband. There is a suspension of
vesting during the time in which the executor had to make his choice
after the death of the testator, and by all rules of construction this is a
condition precedent. It is submitted that this is what the court meant
when it held the bequest of the husband subject to the terms of the
conditional bequest to Anna Schulderman.
This same proposition was discussed in In re Snell's Estate, 227 Wis.
455, 279 N.W. 24, 28 (1938), where the court said: "The bequest of the
paper company stock and the bank stock .. subject to certain conditions, to the payment of the annuity and the establishment of the trust
fund, does not cause the bequest to lose its character as a specific bequest." It is apparent then, that a specific bequest may be made conditional without destroying its legal nature as such.
The court of appeals here also considered the fact that the bequest
would not vest in anyone. It is to be noted in the will that title to the
shares was transferred to the trustees, and they were given authority, in
their discretion, to transfer the said shares to the library trustees, to be
used for -the repair and upkeep of the library building. This discretionary
power of transfer is an added indication of ownership in the trustees.
There is a vesting of legal title in the trustees sufficient to carry out the
purposes of the trust. Backer v. Levy, 82 F.2d 270, 273 (2d Cir. 1936).
It cannot properly and logically be said that there is no interest
vested in anyone, because the beneficiary, city of Bellaire, Ohio, has at
least a "contingent interest," and there is a "fixed right" which the beneficiary has for future enjoyment depending upon fulfillment of the condition imposed. In re Scott's Will, 204 N.Y. Supp. 478 (Surr. Ct. 1924),
discusses the rights of a contingent beneficiary of a trust of personal
property. The payment of the corpus of the bequest was only to be made
upon the performance of the condition precedent, namely, earning ten
thousand dollars and depositing it with the trustees. Since there was no
time limitation annexed to the performance of the condition, the court
decided that the beneficiaries should have a lifetime in which to perform.
In construing the condition to be precedent, -the court said in regard to
vesting, 204 N.Y. Supp. at 491:
The payment of the corpus of the bequest is only to be made upon the
performance of the condition by the son, viz., earning ten thousand dollars
at the specified profession. The earning of this sum, depositing it with the
trustee, is manifestly a condition precedent to payment. This, however,
does not necessarily preclude vesting of a right in the estate in the son. It
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is a contingent estate, but the right to take it into possession, the right to
the payment of the corpus by the trustee upon the performance of the
condition, is a vested right.

Whether the bequest was specific or not was not considered in that
case, but as pointed out, a condition precedent does not destroy the legal
nature of such a bequest. The right of the beneficiary, therefore, is a
present right which cannot be defeated by the act of a 'third party and
which will ripen into a full estate upon the happening of the contingency.
The result is reached, namely that: (1) the condition annexed will
not destroy the legal nature of a specific bequest; (2) the trustee will
have legal title to the estate pending fulfillment of the condition by the
beneficiary; and (3) the right to perform the condition is a vested right
in -thebeneficiary which cannot be defeated by the acts of a third party,
in this case the widow of the settlor; is a most equitable result and one
which gives effect to the intent of the testator. This holding permits the
settlor to dispose of his property on such terms and conditions as he may
wish to incorporate in the trust where to do so does not violate public
policy or settled law. To hold otherwise would be to deny the settlor this
right; it would also deny the beneficiary the right to comply with the
conditions annexed where performance is not impossible or unlawful. The
fact that the bequest is charitable gives added effect to the result considering the liberal construction put upon charitable bequests by the
courts.
John J. Malik, Jr.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - INTERSTATE COMMERCE - OCCUPATION OF
THE FIELD BY THE CARmACK AMENDMENT. Chicago & N.W. Ry. v.

Davenport, 205 F.2d 589 (5th Cir. 1953). The plaintiff railway entered
into a contract with the Dailey Bros. Circus, defendants' partnership,
whereby the plaintiff undertook to provide its facilities and its employees
for the transportation of the circus. The circus agreed to hire the facilities and employees of the plaintiff, who was not to be considered a common carrier, and to assume all liability for any injury to persons, cars, or
property transported under the agreement. This contract was filed with
the Interstate Commerce Commission. An employee of the plaintiff.
while inspecting a car of the circus train, was injured by a loose grab
iron. He asserted a claim against the plaintiff under the Employers'
Liability Act, 35 STAT. 65 (1908), as amended, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60
(1946). The plaintiff gave notice of liability over and tendered defense
of the claim to -the defendants, who denied liability. Thereafter the claim
was settled with the employee by the plaintiff, who now sues the circus
for the amount of the settlement.
In deciding for the circus the district court applied the law of Wisconsin holding that a provision limiting the liability of a common carrier
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is invalid as contrary to public policy. On appeal to this court the plaintiff pleaded the Carmack Amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act,
34 STAT. 595 (1906), 49 U.S.C. § 20 (11) (1946), which regulates the
contractual power to limit liability for damage to property in interstate
commerce. He contended that federal law was determinative of the question, and that state law had no application. The circuit court sustained
this contention, but affirmed the decision of the district court by virtue
of federal law.
Two important questions arise in this case. The first is whether there
is any room for state regulation in cases covered by the Carmack Amendment. The second is whether the validity of a contract coming within the
Carmack Amendment will be determined by state or federal law. Both of
these issues are comprehended by the question, whether Congress has
occupied the field by the passage of the Carmack Amendment.
This question arises under that doctrine of constitutional law first
enunciated in Cooley v. The Board of Wardens, 12 How. 299 (U.S.
1851), and subsequently extended and developed to the modern rule that
where the subject matter is national in character and admits of only one
uniform rule or regulation, the powers of Congress are exclusive, Sanitary District v. United States, 266 U.S. 405 (1925), but where the
subject matter is of diverse character, not requiring uniformity of regulation and admitting of local control, the states may regulate until Congress acts to supersede state laws. Duckworth v. Arkansas, 314 U.S. 390
(1941). The question then is whether a particular act of Congress dealing with the same subject matter does in fact supersede state laws.
Where a federal regulation has not expressly covered a particular subject, the silence of Congress may mean either that the subject matter is
to be left free and unregulated, in which case it is as much a prohibition
on the states as an express provision, Leisy v. Hardin, 133 U.S: 100
(1890); or, it may mean that power to regulate remains in the state, as
is usually true where the subject matter is one which has traditionally
been under state control, such as the power of the several states to enact
legislation in respect to the qualifications, duties, and liabilities of employees on railroad trains, although engaged in interstate commerce,
Chicago R.I. & Pac. Ry. v. Arkansas, 219 U.S. 453 (1911).
The Carmack Amendment was at first construed to do no more than
require that the contract of shipment be reduced to writing so as to provide more perfect evidence, and to make any carrier in a chain liable for
any loss occurring to property while in interstate transportation, in order
to relieve the shipper of the burden of investigation to determine which
of a chain of carriers was in fact responsible for the damage. It was
neither intended to, nor in fact does attempt to regulate the extent of
liability of the common carrier in interstate transportation. Wright v.
Adams Express Co., 230 Pa. 635, 79 Atl. 760 (1911). But the leading
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case under the Carmack Amendment, Adams Express Co. v. Croninger,
226 U.S. 491 (1913), construed that Amendment as occupying the field
of interstate common carrier liability, superseding any state statute, and
requiring the application, whether in state or federal courts, of federal
common law in the absence of a federal statute.
In the Croningercase, supra, a diamond ring, duly packaged and concealed, was delivered to defendant, Adams Express Co., for delivery to
Augusta, Georgia, from a point in Kentucky. The ring never arrived at
its destination. The plaintiff brought suit for the full value of the ring.
The bill of lading, filed with and approved by the Interstate Commerce
Commission, contained a limitation of liability clause graduated to rates
based upon a declared value. The plaintiff, in fact, made no declaration
of value, and by other provisions of the bill of lading this was taken to be
an acceptance of the lowest rate. The state court had overruled the defendant's contention that only federal law could apply in the case because
it came under the Carmack Amendment, and gave judgment to the plaintiff for the full value of the ring. The United States Supreme Court, on
appeal, reversed for the defendant carrier. In support of their holding
that the Carmack Amendment did occupy the field and exclude state
regulation, the Court begins, 226 U.S. at 500, with a general outline of
the powers of Congress:
the constitutional power of Congress to regulate
States and with foreign nations comprehends power
between the shipper and the carrier of an interstate
the liability of the carrier for loss, delay, injury
property....
...

commerce among the
to regulate contracts
shipment by defining
or damage to such

...it is equally well settled that until Congress has legislated upon the
subject, the liability of such a carrier, exercising its calling within a
particular State, although engaged in the business of interstate commerce,
for the loss or damage to such property, may be regulated by the law of
the State. Such regulations would fall within that large class of regulations
which it is competent for a State to make in the absence of legislation by
Congress, growing out of the territorial jurisdiction of the State over such
carriers and its duty and power to safeguard the general public against acts
of misfeasance and nonfeasance committed within its limits, although inter-

state commerce may be indirectly affected. ...
The court then quoted Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. v. Solan, 169 U.S.
133 (1898), to the effect that as long as Congress had not legislated
directly upon the particular subject, state regulation was to be regarded
as legislation in aid of such commerce, and a valid exercise of its police
power "to regulate the relative rights and duties of all persons and
corporations within its limits," and declared itself bound by this decision
unless the Carmack Amendment had changed the situation, 226 U.S. at
504:
Prior to that amendment the rule of carrier's liability for an interstate
shipment of property, as enforced in both Federal and state courts, was

either that of the general common law as declared by this court and
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enforced in the Federal courts throughout the United States . . .or that
prescribed by statute law of a particular State. (citation omitted).

But the Carmack Amendment did change this situation, as was said by
the Court, 226 U.S. at 505, quoting Southern Pac. Co. v. Crenshaw
Bros., 5 Ga. App. 675, 63 S.E. 865 (1909):
"The congressional action has made an end to this diversity; for the
national law is paramount and supersedes all state laws as to the rights and
liabilities and exemptions created by such transactions. This was doubtless
the purpose of the law; and this purpose will be effectuated, and not impaired or destroyed, by the state court's obeying and enforcing the provisions of the Federal statute where applicable to the facts in such cases
as shall come before them."

The Supreme Court continued, 226 U.S. at 505-06:
That the legislation supersedes all the regulations and policies of a particular State upon the same subject results from its general character. It
embraces the subject of the liability of the carrier under a bill of lading
which he must issue and limits his power to exempt himself by rule,
regulation or contract. Almost every detail of the subject is covered so completely that there can be no rational doubt but that Congress intended to
take possession of the subject and supersede all state regulation with reference to it. Only the silence of Congress authorized the exercise of the police
power of the state upon the subject of such contracts. But when Congress
acted in such' a way as to manifest a purpose to exercise its conceded
authority, the regulating power of the State ceased to exist.

The argument was advanced that the third proviso of the Carmack
Amendment preserved the validity of state laws so as to give to a shipper
any right of action, which existed by prior existing state law, but the
Court rejected this argument on the grounds that such a regulation would
nullify the purpose of the Act, and the proviso was construed to mean
that 9nly pre-existing federal rights were preserved.
Every case dealing with this subject decided subsequent to Adams
Express Co. v. Croninger, supra, has conformed to that ruling. Chesapeake & 0.Ry.v. Martin,283 U.S. 209 (1931); Missouri Pacific R.R.
v.Porter, 273 U.S. 341 (1927); Cincinnati N.O.& T.P. Ry.v.Rankin,
241 U.S. 319 (1916); Chicago, St.P.M. & 0.Ry.v. Latta, 226 U.S. 519
(1913); Chicago, B.& Q. Ry.v.Miller, 226 U.S. 513 (1913).
Certain other decisions may appear to reject the doctrine of the Croninger case, Missouri ex rel. St. Louis B. & M. Ry.v.Taylor, 298 Mo.
474, 251 S.W. 383 (1923), aff'd, 266 U.S. 200 (1924); Clark v. Southern Ry., 69 Ind. App. 697, 119 N.E. 539 (1918); Lefebure v. American
Express Co., 160 Iowa 54, 139 N.W. 1117 (1913); Bernardi Greater
Shows, Inc. v. Boston & M.R.R., 86 N.H. 146, 165 Atl. 124 (1933), but
all of these cases are distinguishable on their facts.
Thus, in Lejebure v. American Express Co., supra, the action concerned an alleged fraudulent inducement to sign a bill of lading containing a limitation of liability to a declared value, in fact not declared,
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on a shipment of race horses in interstate commerce. The court recognized the supremacy of federal legislation, and the inapplicability of
state law in a case under the Carmack Amendment, but held that the
question whether or not there was a contract fairly entered into without
fraud, deceit or imposition was a question of local law, not governed by
the decisions of other states or of the United States Supreme Court.
Missouri ex rel. St. Louis, B. & M. Ry. v. Taylor, supra, involved an
action to compel a state judge to hear a cause under the Carmack
Amendment, over which the judge had denied jurisdiction on procedural
grounds. The state court ordered the judge to hear the case notwithstanding federal procedural law refusing jurisdiction on attachment only.
In affirming the decree, the United States Supreme Court said that the
Carmack Amendment is concerned only with substantive law. Congress
might have provided in the amendment for exclusive jurisdiction in federal courts, but it in fact gave concurrent jurisdiction to state courts,
which, therefore, may take jurisdiction of a federal right whenever its
ordinary jurisdiction as prescribed by local law is appropriate to the
occasion and is invoked in conformity with those laws. The Supreme
Court pointed out that the grant of concurrent jurisdiction gives the
plaintiff his choice of courts, with advantages which adhere as incident,
but warned that no peculiarity of state procedure could enlarge or
abridge a substantive federal right.
Finally, both Clark v. Southern Ry., supra, and Bernardi Greater
Shows, Inc., supra, concern actions against interstate common carriers
for personal injuries. In both cases the supremacy of federal law under
the Carmack Amendment was recognized, but it was decided that the
Carmack Amendment applied only to damages sustained by property
carried in interstate commerce, and not to personal injuries. This has
been the state of the law up to the present case. The question might have
been decided by application of the doctrine of "expressio unius est exclusio alterius," but the court in Clark v. Southern Ry., supra, preferred
to base its opinion upon the doctrine that an act of Congress in a field
in which the state has power to legislate until superseded must be specific,
and must clearly cover the subject, and the conflict must be direct and
positive. This unduly restricts congressional action, and does not accord
with other cases on the subject.
Only Wright v. Adams Express Co., 250 Pa. 635, 79 Atl. 760 (1911),
rev'd and remanded, 229 U.S. 629 (1911); and a few cases decided with
it, Davidson v. Adams Express Co., 43 Pa. Super. 53 (1910), and Blackburn v. Adams Express Co., 43 Pa. Super. 276 (1910), are clearly contrary to the Croningercase, but since they were decided two years before
that case, they may be regarded as superseded. The United States
Supreme Court gave no reason for the reversal of the Wright case, supra,
but it may have been upon the grounds expressed in the Croningercase.
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The present case expressly acknowledges the well settled rule that the
Carmack Amendment does not apply to cases involving personal injury,
quoting Chicago, R.I. & Pac. Ry. v. Maucher, 248 U.S. 359 (1919), and
cites the BernardiGreaterShows case, supra, for the distinction between
personal injuries and property injuries under the Carmack Amendment,
but distinguishes this case on the ground that the indemnity against
liability for injury to the railroad's own employees was exacted by the
railroad as a condition of its acceptance of the shipment of the property
provided for in the contract. Because the injured person was an employee
of the railroad, he was not transported under the contract, whereas, in
the Bernardi Greater Shows case, which was similar on its facts to the
present case, the injured parties were employees of the circus; they were
transported under the general contract with the circus for transportation;
and, indemnity for their injury was not a condition to acceptance of the
contract by the railroad.
This factual difference has extended for the first time, the Carmack
Amendment to personal injuries. This makes all carriers in a chain of
carriers liable for the injury, but yet shields them from State regulations,
a long recognized State power, and has substituted in turn the more restricted protection of the Interstate Commerce Act, 24 STAT. 379 (1887),
as amended, 49 U.S.C. §§ 8, 9 (1946), which prohibits common carrier
contracts providing for indemnity for injury to the common carrier's own
employees. It was upon this ground that the indemnity provision was
found to be void in the present case. The next logical step, and one that
was attempted in this case, is for the carrier to avoid the classification as
common carrier, and thereby avoid the federal prohibitions embodied
in the Interstate Commerce Act.
RichardE. Shipman

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW -

SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE -

THE

Tudor v. Board
of Education, .N.J ..... 100 A.2d 857 (1953). The Gideon International,
ESTAnLISHMENT CLAUSE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT. -

a nonprofit sectarian corporation, sought permission from the defendant
school board to distribute the King James version of the Bible to the

students attending the Rutherford, New Jersey, public schools. The
school board adopted a resolution permitting the distribution of Bibles
only to such students who requested them.
Action was brought before the Bibles were distributed to test both
State and Federal Constitutional validity of the plan. A temporary
injunction issued, but was vacated upon a full hearing in superior court,
law division. While appeal was pending the supreme court ordered certification on its own motion. This court affirmed the lower court and held
that the distribution violated the constitutional provision prohibiting
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the making of any law respecting an establishment of religion, and it also
violated the New Jersey constitution prohibiting the establshiment of one
religion in preference to another.
The controversial "establishment of a religion" issue had thus once
more arisen out of a set of facts involving the public education system.
Once more a constitutional right was asserted: Congress shall make no
law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof .... U.S. CONST. AmIEND. I.
The protection of religion under the First Amendment was extended
to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment in Cantwell v. Connecticut,
310 U.S. 296 (1940). In the instant case the court held that distribution
of Gideon Bibles in public schools was violative of the Federal Constitution, supra, and the state constitution: There shall be no establishment
of one religious sect, in preference to another ... N.J. CONST. Art. I,
par. 4.
The court here distinguished another New Jersey case in which a
statute providing for compulsory reading of verses from the New Testament and permissive reading of the Lord's Prayer was upheld, Doremus
v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 429 (1952). Appeal was dismissed by
the Supreme Court in this latter case on the ground of insufficient interest
by the appellant taxpayers. The basis for distinguishing the two cases is
not too evident, but the court seemed to have little difficulty in finding
in the instant case, 100 A.2d at 866, that:
The full force of the violation of both the State and Federal Constitutions
is revealed when we perceive what might happen if a single school board
were besieged by three separate applications for the distribution of Bibles one from Protestants as here, another from Catholics for the distribution
of the Douay Bible, and a third from Jews for the same privilege for their
Bible.

Recent cases indicate a tendency toward a more limited view of the
freedom of religion. This is due mainly to the broader interpretation
given the "establishment clause," which according to the strict rule of the
"absolute separation" theory is a prohibition of any aid whatsoever to
religious or private institutions. In the private school transportation cases
the state courts have found a violation of the nonsectarian policy of
government, Judd v. Board of Education, 278 N.Y. 200, 15 N.E.2d 576
(1938); Mitchell v. ConsolidatedSchool Dist., 17 Wash.2d 61, 135 P.2d
79 (1943); State ex rel. Van Straten v. Milquet, 180 Wis. 109, 192 N.W.
392 (1923). The more liberal interpretation holds such provisions to be
for a public purpose, hence constitutional, Bowker v. Baker, 73 Cal.
App.2d 653, 167 P.2d 256 (1946); Board of Education v. Wheat, 174
Md. 314, 199 Aft. 628 (1938).
The United States Supreme Court has used the "establishment clause"
as a limitation upon the freedom of exercise of religion in interpreting
it as an absolute prohibition of governmental aid, McCollum v. Board of
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Education, 333 U.S. 203 (1948). The basis for this decision was founded
upon a definition in Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 15
(1947):
The "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment means at
least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church
Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one
religion over another.
That the First Amendment operates to prohibit the preference of one
religion over another is not disputed, Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S.
67 (1953), Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). The
issue centers on whether the "establishment clause" precludes generally
and indiscriminately any aid, direct or indirect, to religion. The question
remains, where does establishment end and freedom of exercise of religion begin?
The earlier cases tended toward a more liberal view in determining
when aid was in violation of "establishment": Congressional appropriation to a hospital corporation under control of Catholic nuns, Bradfield
v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899); appropriation from funds held in trust
by the government for religious education, Quick Bear v. Leupp, 210 U.S.
50 (1908).
Another view holds that "establishment" means merely that one religion will not be preferred over another. The traditional view of the
Fourteenth Amendment cases seems to favor this interpretation. The
effect of the Fourteenth Amendment on state action is stated in Cantwell
v. Connecticut, supra, at 303:
The constitutional inhibition of legislation on the subject of religion has
a double aspect. On the one hand, it forestalls compulsion by law of the
acceptance of any creed.... On the other hand, it safeguards the free exercise of the chosen form of religion.

The free exercise of the liberties guaranteed by the First Amendment
are insured by the Fourteenth against state action, which holds that the
First, ". . . must be taken as a command of the broadest scope that
explicit language, read in the context of a liberty-loving society, will
allow." Bridges v. California,314 U.S. 252, 263 (1941). This philosophy
is reflected in a few representative cases respecting speech, Gitlow v. New
York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925); assembly, De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353
(1937); press, Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936).
Nevertheless, these freedoms are not absolute and are subject to a constitutional use of the police powers, Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357
(1927). Not every activity can partake of the "free exercise" immunity
as a religious rite, Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890).
Where the police powers of the state were not involved and there was
no form of compulsion at issue, the cases have upheld the freedom of
exe-rcise of religion as the prime consideration, Pierce v. Society of
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Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); and there must be sufficient cause to
subordinate it to the police power, Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290
(1951).
The no preference theory of the "establishment clause" limits the
freedom of religion in that it precludes any form of compulsion, 2
COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 966-67 (8th ed. 1927), and this

same object is used to justify absolute separation, McCollum v. Board of
Education, 333 U.S. 203, 227 (1948). To the extent, as in the main
case, that "establishment" is interpreted according to the no preference
theory, Madison was directly in point when, in speaking of equality, he
said, ".

.

. we can not deny an equal freedom to them whose minds have

not yet yielded to the evidence that has convinced us." Memorial and
Remonstrance, 1 LETTERS AND OTHER WRITINGS O" JAM'ES MADISON

1769-93, 164 (1884). That a preclusion of any form of compulsion is the
only limitation upon the free exercise of religion appears more consistent
with the idea that the First Amendment only protects freedom of religion
and not freedom from religion, Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952);
Gordon v. Board of Education,78 Cal. App.2d 464, 178 P.2d 488 (1947).
Cases in which aid was directly or indirectly given to a religious society
through the use of state facilities or public funds have not interpreted
"establishment" to mean a complete separation of church and state.
Merely accommodating religious instruction by providing released time
from public school schedules was not violative of the "establishment"
clause, Zorach v. Clauson, supra. Nor was direct aid violative where a
public purpose could be found: school books provided private school
children, Cochran v. Board of Education, 281 U.S. 370 (1930); or
transportation afforded private school children, Everson v. Board of Edu-

cation, supra.
To what extent the New Jersey court in the main case intended to
affirm the "absolute separation" theory as set up by the interpretation
of "establishment" by the Supreme Court, is unknown since the case was
decided mainly on the ground of sectarianism. What the court actually
did was to support the "absolute separation" theory, but it based its
decision upon the no preference rule. The court, basing its conclusions
upon the testimony of psychologists and doctors, found that the distribution of the Bibles would result in pressure being exerted upon the
nonconforming groups, hence creating a preference of the sectarian group
over the nonsectarian. In effect, the main case goes only so far as to say
that the "establishment of religion" clause prohibits a preference of one
religion over another.
The position of the court on the issue of "establishment" would depend upon its interpretation of "favoritism." In the tradition of the
Cantwell case, supra, and the Fourteenth Amendment, it would mean
that no preference is to be shown. The "absolute separation" theory
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would go further and preclude any activity beneficial to a religious
society through the use of public properties. From the fact that the court
adhered to the issue of sectarianism and in light of the former ruling by
the same court in the Doremus case, supra, in effect, permitting an activity on public property which did propagate religion, it appears that the
New Jersey court has, at least presently, avoided the necessity of going
as far as the Supreme Court in adopting the "absolute separation"
theory.
Paul R. Jackiewicz

CONTRACTS -

STATUTE OF FRAUDS -

RIGHT OF VENDOR TO RECOVER

UPON UNENFORCEABLE CONTRACT UNDER EQUITABLE PRINCIPLES.

Mas-

saro v. Bashara, 91 Ohio App. 475, 108 N.E. 2d 850 (1951). Plaintiff
orally negotiated with defendent for the sale of a dwelling house which
defendant then had under construction. Plaintiff deposited with defendant a sum, for which receipt was issued. Plaintiff contends that the
deposit was made on the condition that it be returned in the event that
he decided not to purchase the property. Defendant contends that the
payment was a down payment - earnest money - upon the purchase
of the property and that within a reasonable time thereafter he was
ready, willing and able to convey the property to plaintiff. Further, he
filed a cross-petition for damages sustained because of the plaintiff's default. The latter set up the Statute of Frauds as a defense to this claim
and the court directed a verdict for plaintiff on the cross-petition. The
trial court then instructed the jury that if it found that there was no
agreement between the parties whereby the plaintiff agreed to purchase
the house, then he should get his money back; but if the jury found
that there was a contract between the parties to purchase the property in
question and the sum was paid as a partial payment on the purchase
price, and further that defendant was at all times ready, willing and
able to carry out the contract, then plaintiff could not recover and the
verdict should be for defendant. The jury found for the plaintiff.
The Ohio court of appeals decided the following issue, 108 N.E. 2d at
854:
If a purchaser may recover earnest money paid, when proof of the agreement is barred by the Statute of Frauds upon the principle of unjust
enrichment, [may not] the vendor by way of cross-petition upon equitable
principles be permitted to prove by oral testimony such damage as he may
have suffered as a result of the transaction?

In answering the question in the affirmative the court allowed the
defendant-vendor to claim damages on the basis of an unenforceable
contract. This holding certainly deserves clarification in view of decisions
in similar but distinguishable cases.
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That an oral contract for the sale of real estate is within the Statute
of Frauds and unenforceable unless in writing is a basic concept of contract law. Goette v. Howe, 232 Minn. 168, 44 N.W.2d 737 (1950). The
next point to be considered is the right of the plaintiff-vendee to recover
the money he deposited with the defendant-vendor to serve as a down
payment on the house the defendant was to complete according to his
specifications. Generally speaking, the weight of authority in most jurisdictions would preclude the plaintiff from recovering on a contract unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds if, as here, he repudiated his
part of the bargain, and all the while the vendor was ready, willing and
able to perform. Watkins v. Wells, 303 Ky. 728, 198 S.W.2d 662 (1947);
Dubke v. Kassa, 29 Wash.2d 486, 187 P.2d 611 (1947). The opposite is
true, however, if the vendor refuses performance. Then the purchaser
may recover any down payment he may have made. Gilton v. Chapman,
217 Ark. 390, 230 S.W.2d 37 (1950); Hardy v. Candelain, 204 Miss.
328, 37 So.2d 360 (1948). The important point is that the conduct of the
vendor determines whether or not the vendee is allowed recovery. If he
is at all times ready, willing and able to perform his side of an agreement
a vendee may not recover his down payment, except in such cases where
to deny recovery would unjustly enrich the vendor. This is what occurred
in the present litigation as the plaintiff-vendee repudiated his side of the
contract while the defendant-vendor was to comply with the conditions
necessary to uphold his side of the bargain.
On the other hand some cases have permitted the vendor to retain the
deposit. This has been allowed on various grounds. One theory advanced
in Bernstein v. Rosenzweig, 1 N.J. Super. 48, 62 A.2d 147 (App. Div.
i948), advocates retention of the down payment as damages due the
defendant to compensate him for the plaintiff's breach of contract. As
the court states, 62 A.2d at 149:
Where the prospective buyer pays a deposit to the prospective seller,
merely as a step in the negotiations, and the parties fail to execute the
contract contemplated by them, the deposit may be recovered by the buyer.
...On the other hand, where the parties have entered into a binding agreement, and the buyer defaults thereunder, the seller may, in general, retain
the deposit as damages.

In a similar vein Corbin points out in his article, The Right of a Defaulting Vendee to the Restitution of Installments Paid, 40 YALE L.J.
1013, 1023 (1931) that:
...it is clear that the vendee in default should in no case be given restitution of money paid unless it affirmatively appears that the money so paid
is in excess of the injury caused to the vendor by the breach. The vendee
sues because he asserts that retention of the money is unjust enrichment;
but there is no injustice if the defendant is retaining no more than the
amount of injury caused by the plaintiff's breach.

That the defendant sustains damage in the original action by the plaintiff's refusal to execute the agreement to buy the house as he has
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promised is obvious. Hence, it is only reasonable that he should be
allowed to retain the down payment as a compensatory measure.
A second theory which the defendant may utilize to justify his retention of the down payment is based upon the equitable principle that he is
entitled to it as a result of the plaintiff's refusal to consummate the contract. Although this point of view has never been specifically upheld by
judicial decision prior to the advent of the case at bar, at least one case
on record substantially endorses its adoption, Triplett v. Knight, 309 Ky.
349, 217 S.W.2d 802 (1949). Plaintiff there orally contracted with defendant to buy his farm and made a down payment on same, the
remainder to be paid when defendant conveyed a deed to the property to
plaintiff. Defendant failed to tender the deed, and plaintiff sued for the
recovery of his down payment. It was held that the plaintiff was entitled
to recover as defendant was neither ready, willing nor able to deliver the
Jeed and possession of the farm to plaintiff on the set date. The court
said, 217 S.W.2d at 803:
Equitable principles require that if a vendor of real estate under an oral
contract of sale is to retain any part of the purchase price advanced, he
must in good faith be in a position to carry out his part of the bargain.

The rule may be rephrased to read like this: Upon equitable principles
a vendor of real estate under an oral contract of sale may retain a down
payment on the purchase price if he acts in good faith and is at all times
ready, willing and able to carry out his part of the bargain. Such was
the situation in the instant case. The defendant-vendor acted in good
faith and at all times was prepared to carry out his part of the bargain,
i.e., to complete the building of the house to the plaintiff-vendee's specifications. Thus, when the plaintiff-vendee refused to perform the contract the Ohio court reasoned correctly that even though the contract
was unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds, equity would grant relief
by allowing the defendant-vendor to retain the down payment.
Suppose, however, for the sake of argument, that in the original
action, the money was not considered a down payment at all but, rather,
it was to be an indication of the willingness of the plaintiff-vendee to
enter into a contract upon terms to be agreed upon thereafter. After all,
such is the function of a deposit in most sales transactions. See Sousa v.
First California Co., 101 Cal. App.2d 533, 225 P.2d 955, 959 (1950).
Could the defendant-vendor retain the down payment under these conditions? Present authority as set out in Fischer v. Riverso, 113 N.Y.S.2d
59 (Sup. Ct., App. T. 1952) says no. This proceeding reversed Fischer
v. Riverso, 103 N.Y.S.2d 686 (N.Y. Munic. Ct. 1951), wherein it was
held that even though an agreement for the purchase of a dwelling house
was void under the Statute of Frauds, the plaintiff, having repudiated
his contract, could not recover the down payment if the defendant was at
all times ready to convey the property as per their original understanding. The ground for reversal was that the down payment was given only
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as a deposit in contemplation of a contract subsequently to be made and
hence was recoverable by the plaintiff, in absence of proof of damage by
the defendant. Therefore, one can readily see that had the plaintiffvendee in the instant case been able to show that the money he paid the
defendant-vendor was not a down payment but merely evidence of intent
to enter into a contract on terms to be agreed upon at a later date, he
would have prevented the defendant's retention of the money in question.
As has been said before, the practical effect of the ruling in this action
is to allow a defendant-vendor to recover on an unenforceable contract.
That is, he may retain a down payment made on a contract for the sale
of real property, unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds, upon equitable principles. Does such a holding have a place in American jurisprudence? It would seem that it does. Defendant-vendors of real
property who act in good faith and at all times are ready, willing and
able to carry out their part of the bargain are protected from any
arbitrary, whimsical repudiations of the agreement on the part of plaintiff-vendors which would cause them damage. Inasmuch as the purpose
of the law is to insure justice for all, any ruling tending to promote this
end is both necessary and vital.
Mark S. Tolle

CORPORATIONS CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTIONS. A. P. Smith Mfg.
Co. v. Barlow, 13 N.J.L. 145, 98 A.2d 581 (Sup. Ct. 1953). The Smith
Manufacturing Company has regularly made contributions to various
charitable organizations. In 1951, the directors adopted a resolution to
join with others in the 1951 Annual Giving to Princeton University and
appropriated $1,500 for the University as a contribution toward its
maintenance. This action was questioned by the stockholders, and as a
result a declaratory judgment action was instituted by the corporation.
The Chancery Division held the donation to be intra vires. An appeal
taken to the Appellate Division was certified directly to the Supreme
Court which held that a corporation may make reasonable contributions
even apart from express statutory provisions, the underlying theory
being that modern conditions require that corporations acknowledge and
discharge social as well as private responsibilities as members of the
communities within which they operate.

This case raises the question: May the corporation stockholders protest a charitable contribution to a worthy agency as an ultra vires act?
The term ultra vires as commonly used is generally applied in two
situations. The first is where a corporation has no power from its charter
to perform the act, and secondly, where the charter permits the corporate
act but there has been an irregular exercise of that granted power.
People ex rel. Barrett v. Bank of Peoria, 295 Ill. App. 543, 15 N.E.2d
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333, 335 (1938). The donation by the directors in the present case is
questioned as ultra vires in the second sense.
A corporation may do only those things which by law it is authorized
to do. These powers stem from the charter under which the corporation
is organized. Along with the express powers are various incidental
powers necessary to carry out the purpose for which the corporation
was created. Green Bay and Minnesota R.R. v. Union Steamboat Co.,
107 U.S. 98 (1882). A corporate donation was sustained in Whetstone v.
Ottawa, 13 Kan. 240 (1874), when a number of lots were given to a
university for the erection of buildings. The court held that as long as
the direct and proximate result sought to be obtained by the donation
was the enhancement of remaining corporate property, the act was not
ultra vires. In Fulton v. Sterling Land and Investment Co., 47 Kan.
621, 28 Pac. 720 (1892), a corporation was permitted to erect a college
building because there was a direct benefit to the corporation as a result
of the gift; namely, its land was greatly increased in value. The donation
of $500 by a bank to induce a manufacturing company to remain in
town was considered ultra vires in McCrory v. Chambers, 48 Ill. App.
445 (1892), because there was no sign of a future benefit to the corporation.
A definite principle is shown in these early cases: In the absence of
expressed power in the charter concerning donations, an incidental
power will be implied only if there is a direct benefit received by the
corporation as a result of the gift. Under this early common law theory,
the donation of the Smith Company in the instant case would be considered ultra vires as there is no direct benefit to the corporation resulting
from the gift.
Gradually the power of corporate giving has been extended. Contributions by a musical instrument company for the construction of housing,
churches, schools, and a library for employees was upheld in Steinway v.
Steinway and Sons, 17 Misc. 43, 40 N.Y. Supp. 718, 720 (Sup. Ct.
1896), the court stating:
If that act is one which is lawful in itself, and not otherwise prohibited,
is done for the purpose of serving corporate ends, is reasonably tributary to
the promotion of those ends, in a substantial, and not in a remote or
fanciful, sense, it may fairly be considered within charter powers.
Maintaining a music school in connection with its business for a more
effective distribution of its product (pianos) has been considered as
furthering the object of the company. Virgil v. Virgil Practice Clavier
Co., 33 Misc. 200, 68 N.Y. Supp. 335 (Sup. Ct. 1900). Employees welfare was considered as further corporate ends. People ex rel. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Hlotchkiss, 136 App. Div. 150, 120 N.Y. Supp. 649
(3d Dep't 1909). Contributions by a corporation to educate students in
local schools was held not ultra vires because of sufficient probability of
direct benefit in the securing of business trained employees. Armstrong
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Cork Co. v. H. A. Meldrum Co., 285 Fed. 58 (W.D. N.Y. 1922). The
concept of probability of direct benefit is advanced in these cases. No
longer is the old idea of an absolute direct benefit to the corporation
needed as a pre-requisite for a gift; an indirect benefit being sufficient to
uphold the gift.
Corporations have been permitted to take a deduction in their tax
returns for charitable contributions. These deductions are permitted as
a necessary business expense. In ForbesLithograph Mfg. Co. v. White,
42 F.2d 287 (D. Mass. 1930), a contribution to a foundation established
for the benefit of the company's employees was deductible. So also was
a donation to a hospital by a corporation deductible as a necessary
business expense. The reason behind this decision was that the company's
employees and their families constituted two-thirds of the city's population and some provision must be made for the health and welfare of these
people. Corning Glass Works v. Lucas, 37 F.2d 798 (D.C. Cir. 1929),
cert. denied, 281 U.S. 742 (1930). From these cases it can be seen that
the necessity for corporate donations has received government recognition through the policy of permitting tax deductions. The importance of
charitable contributions has also received recognition by state legislatures, twenty-nine of which have passed statutes permitting such contributions; among these are: California, Delaware, Illinois, Indiana,
Michigan, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin. A~nws,
CORPORATION GIVING, 236 and n.1 (1952). The New Jersey law is typical, N. J. Rxv. STAT. § 14:3-13 (1937):
Any corporation, organized under any laws of this state whatsoever, may
co-operate with other corporations and with natural persons in the creation
and maintenance of community funds or of charitable, philanthropic or
benevolent instrumentalities conducive to public welfare....

Such state statutes adopted in the public interest have consistently
been upheld by the courts. They have been applied to pre-existing corporations as well as to corporations that received their charter after the
enactment of the legislation. The reserved power or the police power of
the states in the public interest is the basis for their application to preexisting corporations. Davis v. Louisville Gas and Electric Co., 16 Del.
Ch. 157, 142 Atl. 654 (Ch. 1928); Somerville v. St. Louis Min. & Mill
Co., 46 Mont. 268, 127 Pac. 464 (1912); Hinckley v. Schwarzschild and
Sulzberger Co., 107 App. Div. 470, 95 N.Y. Supp. 357 (1st Dep't 1905).
Thus the court in the principal case considered the New Jersey statute
and the rule that in the public interest a statute may be applied to a
pre-existing corporation. But the court went further in holding that
corporate power to make reasonable charitable contributions exists today
under the expanded common law principles apart from such permissive
legislation. The statute is merely a declaration of such power with added
limitations. 98 A.2d at 590.
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Even though a corporation may make reasonable charitable donations
under the state statutes, the directors may not make a gift of corporate
assets. In the interest of business and the investing public the courts will
not permit a disposal of corporate property as a gift. Bassick v. Aetna
Explosives Co., 246 Fed. 974, 993 (S.D.N.Y. 1917). In Greene County
Farm Nat. Loan Ass'n v. Federal Land Bank, 57 F. Supp. 783, 789
(W.D. Ky. 1944), aff'd, 152 F.2d 215 (6th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 328
U.S. 834 (1946), the bank cancelled outstanding indebtedness amounting to over $1,000,000 and distributed bank funds so as to improve the
financial condition of certain Farm Loan Associations. The court held
this action permissible. An important element in this decision was that a
corporation can not legally give away its assets over the objection of
protesting stockholders, but they may make substantial contributions
where the so called gift tends reasonably to promote good will in the
business of the corporation. As long as there is some benefit to the company, even though indirect, reasonable donations are permitted.
In the early history of this country corporations were few in number,
and very little of the country's wealth was possessed by them. Through
the years they have increased in number until today corporations control
much of the wealth of the country. With the expanded common law
doctrine of corporate donations, permissive statutes of states, and the
decision of this case applying the common law and recent permissive
statutes to pre-existing corporations, most impediments to reasonable
charitable contributions are eliminated. Various funds, e.g., the Ford
Motor Company Scholarship Fund, the General Electric Educational
Fund, and the Sears-Roebuck Foundation, all are evidence of valid charitable contributions of corporations in the public interest.
HarryL. Buck

CRIMINAL LAW

-

WAIVER OF UNANIMOUS

VERDICT IN JURY TRIAL.

-Hibdon v. United States, 204 F.2d 834 (6th Cir. 1953). Appellant
was tried in a federal district court before a jury for the commission
of a felony. After the jury had deliberated for a short time they
reported to the court that they were unable to reach a unanimous
verdict. Whereupon, the court inquired of counsel for both parties as
to the acceptability of a majority verdict. Appellant's attorney, after
consultation with the appellant, and the United States Attorney consented to a majority verdict. There were two counts in the indictment,
a poll of the jury revealing a nine to three vote for conviction on the first
count and a ten to two vote for conviction on the second count. A verdict
of "guility" was ordered to be filed with the clerk on both counts. A
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motion to vacate having been denied, an appeal to the United States
court of appeals was taken. That court reversed and remanded for trial
in conformity with the principles enunciated therein.
Can the accused in a federal criminal jury trial waive his right to a
unanimous verdict? Although, in certain circumstances the accused in a
federal criminal proceeding may waive his right to a trial by jury in favor
of the court's resolving the issues of fact, yet it was held here that where
a jury trial is had, a unanimous verdict must be reached for a valid resolution of the facts in issue.
It should be noted that a seemingly conclusive argument supporting
this decision was accepted by the court at the outset but was not relied
upon as the basis of the decision. This argument is founded on FED. R.
CRia. P. 31(a), which provides: "The verdict shall be unanimous. It
shall be returned by the jury to the judge in open court." The legislative
history of this provision is discussed by the court in the principal case.
It discloses an attempt to provide, in the original draft of the rule, for
written waiver of a unanimous verdict:
Return. A verdict shall be unanimous, but by written stipulation of the
parties approved by the court it may be by a stated majority of the jurors.
It shall be returned by the jury to the judge in open court. FED. R. CRIM. P.
(First Preliminary Draft) 29(a) (1943).

This received strenous objection by bench and bar with the result that
the provision was omitted. The final draft then, in light of its history,
would preclude the possibility of a majority verdict.
Because of the insistence by the United States counsel that waiver
could still be effective as to the proposition, the court chose to base its
decision on judicial policy and the Fourteenth Amendment.
The right to a trial by jury in federal criminal cases has been repeatedly affirmed by the United States Supreme Court in light of U.S. CoNsT.
Art. III, § 2, which provides in part: "The trial of all Crimes, except in
Cases of Impeachment, shall be by jury. . . " This is interpreted to be
in pari materiawith Amendment VI of the United States Constitution,
Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 298 (1930); Callan v. Wilson,
127 U.S. 549 (1888), which states: "In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial
jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed ......
The result reached in Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343, 349 (1898),
as to the effect of these constitutional provisions (Art. III, § 2 and
Amendment VI) was that the accused, in a federal proceeding, is not
only entitled to a jury, but to a twelve man jury because of the common
law background of the provisions therein. In that case the problem was
that of subsequent objection to the eight man jury, i.e., after the trial by
the smaller jury had been consented to, impliedly, by the defendant, and
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the state constitutional provision was held to be an ex post facto law as it
affected the accused who committed a felony prior to the admission of
that state (Utah) to the Union. The court also held that this twelve man
jury could not be waived. But it has been pointed out in Patton v. United
States, supra, 281 U.S. at 293, that this holding was obiter dictum because there was no problem of express waiver before the case went to the
jury, which is the problem discussed here.
However, these rules do not necessarily apply to the states. In the
absence of a state statute on the subject, a verdict in a state court trial
must be unanimous. This rule applies to civil as well as criminal proceedings. American Pub. Co. v. Fisher, 166 U.S. 464 (1897). Where there is
a state constitutional provision which reduces the size of the jury to
eight, such a provision has been upheld if all persons within the jurisdiction are entitled to be proceeded against in the same way. Maxwell v.
Dow, 176 U.S. 581 (1900). The problem of unanimity of the verdict was
not there in issue because the Utah statute involved, although reducing
the number of jurors, specifically required a unanimous decision by that
reduced number in criminal cases. However, the need of unanimity was
dispensed with in Jordan v. Massachusetts, 225 U.S. 167, 176 (1912),
when it was said:
In criminal cases due process of law is not denied by a state law
which dispenses with a grand jury indictment and permits prosecution upon
information, nor by a law which dispenses with the necessity of a jury of
twelve, or unanimity in the verdict. Indeed the requirement of due process
does not deprive a State of the power to dispense with jury trial altogether.

All of these considerations ultimately fall back on the theory of Hurtado v. California,110 U.S. 516 (1884) as stated in Brown v. New Jersey, 175 U.S. 172, 175 (1899), and reiterated in Maxwell v. Dow, supra,
176 U.S. at 605:
...the State has full control over the procedure in its courts, both in civil
and criminal cases, subject only to the qualification that such procedure
must not work a denial of fundamental rights or conflict with specific and
applicable provisions of the Federal Constitution.

See also Iowa Central Ry. v. Iowa, 160 U.S. 389 (1896); Ex parte Reggel, 114 U.S. 642 (1885).
Although limits have been set out for state and federal legislation as
they affect the right to a jury trial under the United States Constitution,
a different matter arises when the question of waiver is considered. Herein lies the issue of the principal case. Is it possible for an accused to
waive rights which the state and the Federal Government are unable by
their own motion to affect?
Patton v. United States, supra, is a leading case on this matter and is
relied on in the principal case although distinguished as to effect. The
court, although not called upon to pass upon the problem of unanimity,
did hold there that an accused in a federal proceeding can waive his right
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to a twelve man jury. The case is of special value in its reasoning rather
than in its direct holding. It held that Article III, § 2, when construed in
pari materia with the Sixth Amendment confers the right to a jury trial
with all its concomitants. The necessity of twelve men being on the
((constitutional jury" is just as great as the necessity of the accused having any jury. If the accused is entitled to any jury, he is entitled to a
twelve man jury.
But a jury is not a jurisdictional requirment of federal courts. Schick
v. United States, 195 U.S. 65, 70 (1904). Jurisdictional requirements of
a court, by definition, cannot be waived. "Jurisdiction of the subjectmatter must always be derived from the law, and not from the consent
of the parties. ..

."

Harrisv. People, 128 Ill. 585, 591, 21 N.E. 563, 564

(1889). A jury, however, is merely a right of the accused which can be
waived. Kearney v. Case, 12 Wall. 275, 281 (U.S. 1871). And if it is
waived the court still retains jurisdiction of the case because it would be
unreasonable to create a court which only had jurisdiction over a defendant if he did not relinquish a right which, under the creating statute of
the same legislature can be waived, Patton v. United States, supra, 276
U.S. at 299.
It has been urged that public policy forbids the waiver of a jury trial
because of its importance to the accused. Cancemi v. The People, 18
N.Y. (4 Smith) 128, 137 (1858). However, in rebuttal, if policy permits
a plea of guilty whereby the whole jury trial is waived, policy should
permit a waiver as to the number of jurors. State v. Kaufman, 51 Iowa
578, 2 N.W. 275 (1879); State v. Baer, 103 Ohio St. 585, 134 N.E. 786
(1921). At common law the accused had no right to select his own counsel, nor could he testify in his own behalf. In order to protect such a
person from abuse because of his quasi-helpless situation, the courts
permitted no waiver of his right to a jury. However, with the advent of
the modern criminal trial the accused is no longer in a helpless condition.
He can testify in his own behalf and employ his own counsel. For this
reason he is now permitted to make an intelligent waiver of his rights.
Hack v. State, 141 Wis. 346, 351, 124 N.W. 492, 494 (1910). He can
waive his right to any jury and consent to trial by the court even if he is
without assistance of counsel at the time of the waiver, provided he is of
sufficient intelligence. Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S.
269 (1942). As was stated in the Patton case, supra, 281 U.S. at 306:
The truth is that the theory of public policy embodies a doctrine of
vague and variable quality, and, unless deducible in the given circumstances
from constitutional or statutory provisions, should be accepted as the
basis of a judicial determination, if at all, only with the utmost circumspection. The public policy of one generation may not, under changed conditions, be the public policy of another.

In light of this reasoning as to waiver of a complete jury trial, it would
be very difficult to see what should prevent a waiver of a unanimous
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verdict. If he can waive a twelve man jury for an eight man jury, he
would seem to be entitled to waive a 12 to 0 vote for a 10 to 2 or a 9 to 3
decision. In fact it might seem that the right to an unanimous verdict
would be more easily waived than the right to a twelve man jury in that
fewer votes are taken to convict in an 8 to 0 decision than are taken in a
9 to 3 or 10 to 2 conviction. However, the court in the principal case
states that although the accused enjoys considerably more freedom in his
trial, the basic policy to prevent the conviction of the innocent remains.
The court states that it is easier to convict a man by majority verdict
than by unanimous verdict regardless of the total number of jurors. This,
no doubt is based on the statement in the Patton case, supra, 281 U.S. at
312, which narrows the scope of its reasoning:
...we do not mean to hold that the waiver must be put into effect at all
events.... Trial by jury is the normal and, with occasional exceptions, the
preferable mode of disposing of issues of fact in criminal cases above the
grade of petty offenses .... And the duty of the trial court in that regard
[regulation of waiver] is not to be discharged as a matter of rote, but with
sound and advised discretion....
On this the principal case seems to "hang its hat." It states, 204 F.2d at
838, that the unanimity aspect of a verdict is not a "privilege to be
enjoyed" under the Sixth Amendment but rather an "inescapable element of due process that has come down to us from earliest time." Thus
the court accepts the jurisdictional and policy arguments of prior cases,
but extends the cloak of procedural due process over the right to a
unanimous verdict on the reasoning that "there cannot be a verdict supported by proof beyond reasonable doubt if one or more jurors remain
reasonable in doubt as to guilt."
It is also suggested, 204 F.2d at 839, that the idea of waiver, having
originated in the mind of the court rather than the accused in this case
may have been, in fact, imposed on the accused under the circumstances.
This imposition may have collaterally defeated due process, regardless of
the considerations on the necessity of the unanimous verdict, in that no
valid waiver was, in fact, made. But this collateral argument is somewhat
academic in that the court held that even a freely made waiver, as to
unanimity, would be invalid on grounds of the policy behind due process.
The result of this decision leaves the federal law on waiver of jury and
its concomitants in a peculiar state. The accused may waive a jury trial
completely by pleading guilty and may waive his right to a twelve man
jury thereby permitting an eight man conviction. But he cannot permit
a conviction by majority even though nine or ten or eleven men feel he is
guilty if there are dissents within the group. Basically the issue may be
reduced to a theoretical matter of opinion. Is it easier to convince nine
of twelve men of a defendant's guilt than it is to convince all eight men
of an eight man jury? The federal courts say it is.
Stanley R. Herrlinger

RECENT DECISIONS
EQUITY

EFFECT ON SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF TIME REQUIREMurphy v. Porter, .. Ohio L. Abst....., 114
N.E.2d 89 (C.P.), aff'd per curiam, 114 N.E.2d 97 (Ohio App. 1952).
Plaintiffs signed a contract to purchase the defendant's farm. The contract stipulated: "Payment to be paid in full January 24, 1951, Possession February Ist, 1951 on or about." Because of the death of the real
estate broker plaintiffs did not tender payment on January 24th and were
unable to contact the defendants to close the deal until February Ist,
1951. The defendants apparently agreed with this new closing date, but
when the day for payment arrived they' refused to comply - claiming
they were sorry that they had agreed to sell. Their defense was that since
the original contract stipulated January 24, 1951, as payment day, they
did not have to accept payment on February Ist, 1951.
Plaintiff brought a suit in equity for specific performance of the contract. The court granted the decree, stating, 114 N.E.2d at 94: "time of
performance is not of the essence of a contract unless made so by its
terms or by the act of the parties," and that equity would in such cases
grant specific performance to the parties. This decision was upheld by the
Court of Appeals, 114 N.E.2d 97 (1952).
This contract stated a definite time for the payment of the purchase
price and thus on the law side of the court the party who failed to
comply would have a difficult time recovering damages. 3 WILLISTON,
CONTRACTS § 845 (2d ed. 1936). On the other side, however, equity is
as formal as the courts of law, but seeks to ascertain the intent of the
parties to the contract and if the granting of the decree would seriously
damage either party. The question thus presented here is in a suit for
specific performance, will equity ever allow the defense of plaintiff's non
performance within the contract time when time was not stated to be of
the essence?
Equity will not be restrained in its interpretation of contracts fixing a
specific time for performance, but rather it will examine the contract to
ascertain the weight given by the parties to the time requirement and
will act accordingly. The court in the case of Hayes Mfg. Corp. v. McCauley, 140 F.2d 187, 189 (6th Cir. 1944), set forth that:
-

MENTS IN CONTRACTS. -

The general rule in equity as distinguished from that applicable to suits
at law seeking damages for breach of contract, is that time is not of the
essence of the contract unless it has been so treated by the parties, or is
necessarily so from the nature of the contract.

Cf.,Hoffman v. Perkins,3 N.J. Super. 474, 67 A.2d 210, 213 (Ch. 1949).
This is the position taken by RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 276, comment
e (1932).
In a recent California decision, Katemis v. Westerlind, 261 P.2d 553
(Cal. 1953), an escrow agreement required that the check be deposited
March 1, but it did not arrive until March 3. The plaintiff sued for
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specific performance, and the defendant claimed as a defense the delay
of two days in the depositing of the check. The court granted the decree
by adopting the "common sense" argument that when the delay is only
minor, it is to the best interest of both parties to grant specific performance. The court, 261 P.2d at 558, stated the modern view to be:
... that valuable contractural rights should not be surrendered or forfeitures suffered by a slight delay in performance unless such intention
clearly appears from the contract or where specific enforcement will work
injustice after a delayed tender.

If the contract discloses the intention of the parties to be that "time
is of the essence," then equity will interpret and enforce this provision as
strictly as the law courts. Harry Manaster& Bro. v. Young, 302 Ill. App.
545, 24 N.E.2d 215 (1939). But cf. Norton v. Miller, 138 N.J. Eq.
235, 47 A.2d 738 (Ch. 1946). But equity with its broad investigatory
procedures and with its regard for substantive content will look behind
such words as "time is of the essence", or others to that effect, to see if
that is really the intent of the parties. Diamonde v. Berkeley Tp., 142
N.J. Eq. 140, 59 A.2d 617 (Ch. 1948). In 3 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS

§ 852 n.8 (2d ed. 1936), the rule is stated that: "The fact that the contract expressly states that time is of the essence is not conclusive. Other
provisions of the contract may be so inconsistent with this as to lead to
the conclusion that time is not essential."
In the case of Phillis v. Gross, 32 S.D. 438, 143 N.W. 373 (1913),
involving monthly payments on a note, the contract stated as part of the
printed form that time was of the essence and that non-payment on the
date set for performance would discharge the vendors from their obligations under the contract. The court had a definite time that could have
been considered controlling and since the plaintiff breached the time requirement, the court could have denied relief; but it adopted the rule
that other provisions of the contract may throw a different light on the
"time is of the essence" clause. The court refused to be governed by this
provision only and reading the whole contract to understand the full
meaning and intent of the parties held that an interlined provision calling for the payment of interest on all overdue sums, superseded this time
stipulation.
In an action for specific performance where there had been a breach of
the particular time requirement, Western Town Site Co. v. Lamro Town
Site Co., 31 S.D. 47, 139 N.W. 777, 779 (1913), the equity court proposed a very liberal rule, that where:
...there is nothing special in the nature of the property, or of the purposes for which it was intended, although a particular day may be fixed for
the completion of the contract, yet the general object being the accomplishment of the purpose for which the promise was made, viz., the completion
of the contract, the particular day named is merely formal.

What the courts are trying to establish as the rule is the practice of enforcing the contract if the breach is not a major condition of the con-

. RECENT DECISIONS
tract and will not cause undue harm. Tfie courts feel that by enforcing
the contract even though the time requirement has been breached, they
are advancing the object and purpose of the contract. Rielly v. City
DepositBank & Trust Co., 322 Pa. 577, 185 Atl. 620, 624 (1936).
In Harrellv. Stumberg, 220 La. 811, 57 So.2d 692 (1952), the court
examined a contract that provided that the sale of a parcel of realty be
closed within thirty days. The buyer did not perform the sale within the
stated time, whereupon he was informed by the vendor that the contract
was no longer valid. The court in discussing the action for specific performance presented the strict view of equity by holding that the time
limit of thirty days was sufficiently definite to give evidence of, and to
make, the time the essence of the contract. Enforcement was thus
denied the plaintiff having defaulted in taking title within the stipulated
period or securing an extension in writing of the time. The decision of the
Louisiana court in refusing to grant specific performance is based also on
the Statute of Frauds, which requires that a contract for the transfer of
an interest in land be in writing. The court takes the position that since
a contract to sell land must be in writing, an extension of the time
stipulated in the written contract should also be in writing, and to grant
specific performance would violate the Statute of Frauds. Holt v.
Schmidt, 220 La. 249, 56 So.2d 412 (1951).
The court in the instant case could have applied the rule of the
Louisiana court, Harrell v. Stumberg, supra, that to grant specific performance after a breach of a time requirement would be a breach of the
Statute of Frauds. But the court applied a principle of equity that is
generally held to be the correct rule: that equity does not consider time
to be of the essence of the contract unless so made by the intent of the
parties. It keeps equity procedure free to examine fully each contract to
determine the actual intent of the parties, and if the breach of the time
requirement is only minor in the light of that intent, equity will grant
the decree for specific performance.
John W. Houck

LABOR LAW -

FEDERAL PRE-EMPTION OF LABOR DISPUTES -

CLAIM

NFLRA AND LMRA. - Garnerv. Teamsters, Chauffeurs and Helpers, Etc., .... U.S ..... ,. 74 Sup. Ct. 161 (1953).
Petitioners were interstate truckers who employed twenty-four men,
four of whom were members of the respondent union. No controversy,
concerning labor conditions was in progress, and at no time had the
petitioners objected to any form of unionization. Respondents, however,
placed rotation pickets near the petitioners' loading platform. Placards
carried by the pickets urged union membership in order to gain union
OF PRIVATE RIGHTS UNDER THE
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wages, hours and working conditions. The picketing was conducted in
an orderly and peaceful manner, but drivers of other carriers refused to
cross the picket line, and as most of the petitioners' business was done in
an interchange of freight with union concerns, there resulted a loss to th(
petitioners of approximately 95 percent of their trade.
A state equity court held that the respondent union had violated the
Pennsylvania Labor Relations Act, Pa.Stat. Ann. tit. 43, § 211.6 (1952),
by attempting to coerce the petitioners to discriminate in favor of the
union and aid its membership. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, however, reversed this decision concluding that the grievance of the petitioners fell solely within the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations
Board, thereby precluding state relief. The petitioners on certiorari to
the United States Supreme Court advanced the theory that the NLRB
enforces only public rights or interests, hence leaving the injured party
an option to seek vindication of his private right in a state court. The
concept argued is that federal occupancy of one phase does not prevent
state courts from exercising their conventional equity powers over the
other. The distinction between the two rights is said to have arisen from
legislative intent and judicial recognizance.
In the instant case, however, the Court affirmed the dismissal of the
petitioners' bill in deciding that a state tribunal had no jurisdiction over
an alleged unfair labor practice regardless of a violation of state law if
the NLRB had jurisdiction over the controversy initially. The assertion
of a violation of a private right was held to have merit neither in the Act
nor in judicial expression.
A detailed analysis of petitioners' argument highlights the issue here
as to who had proper jurisdiction. It was alleged that the preamble of the
Labor Management Relations Act draws the necessary distinction to
allow enforcement of either right and purportedly reveals the intent of
Congress. At 61 STAT. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §§ 141 et seq. (Supp.
1952), it is stated:
Industrial strife . . . can be avoided . . . if employers, employees, and

labor organizations each recognize . . . one another's legitimate rights in
their relations with each other, and above all recognize under law that
neither party has any right in its relations with any other to engage in acts
or practices which jeopardize the public health, safety, or interest.
It is the purpose and policy of this Act ... to provide orderly and peaceful procedures for preventing the interference by either with the legitimate
rights of the other . . . to define and proscribe practices on the part of
labor and management which affect commerce and are inimical to the
general welfare, and to protect the rights of the public in connection with
labor disputes affecting commerce.

It is said that if this provision is read with the Senate Report of the Act
no other conclusion can be drawn. See Rose, The Labor Management
Relations Act and the State's Power to Grant Relief, 39 VA. L. REV. 765
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(1953). This committee reports, SEN. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st
Sess. 8 (1947), states that after considering the evidence and defining
unfair labor practices,
... the committee is convinced that additional procedures must be made
available under the National Labor Relations Act in order adequately to
protect the public welfare....
Hence we have provided that the Board, acting in the public interest and
not in vindication of purely private rights, may seek injunctive relief in the
case of all types of unfair labor practices....

The petitioners asserted that Congress, in light of these statements,
recognized the two distinct classes of rights.
The mere expression by Congress that it is protecting the public interest does not indicate an intent to exclude protection of private rights or
set those rights asea in a current of state control. It seems unquestionable that the plain intent of the statute was to include within the meaning of public right, all rights, whether public or private. The Court in the
principal case aptly intimated that the situation is analogous to the
problem prior to the enactment of the Commerce Clause. That Clause,
it is submitted, is now considered all inclusive, allowing the states the sole
right to provide police measures for the protection of its citizens. If two
distinct remedies may be sought the danger of conflict is imminent.
Common sense dictates that when there is so much room for disagreement, the federal law was meant to be supreme. There seems to be no
argument for concurrent control by the states.
Nor do the latest cases bear out the contentions of the petitioners. The
rule that Congress must manifest an intent to occupy a field in order to
preclude state action is unquestioned. Maurer v. Hamilton, 309 U. S.
598, 614 (1940); Reid v. Colorado, 187 U. S. 137, 148 (1902). However, the nature of the legislation and its subject matter may imply an
intent on the part of Congress to exclude state control although not
expressly stated. Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 272 U. S. 605
(1926). It seems apparent from the following cases that Congress has so
implied its intent.
The first case purported to support the view of private rights is said to
be Allen-Bradley Local 1111 v. Wisconsin ERB, 315 U.S. 740 (1942),
which arose under the NLRA. The union there had called a strike which
lasted approximately three months. Differences between the strikers and
non-strikers ensued and the company petitioned for state interference.
Relief was granted; a cease and desist order issued against mass picketing, threatening of bodily injury to non-strikers, obstructing street and
factory entrances and picketing the homes of certain employees. On
appeal the Supreme Court, confining itself strictly to the facts, reasoned
that the activity in the case was not covered by the NLRA, thus the
state could provide proper police measures. Unless the state did so act,
these alleged injuries would have proven completely destructive of the
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petitioners' business. Thus the state was protecting a breach of the peace
which was wholly apart from what the Act attempted to cover.
Next was Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York State LRB, 330 U. S. 767
(1947). A controversy arose as to whether foremen could organize under
the provisions of the NLRA. The national board refused to entertain a
petition to determine the dispute, but authorized presentment of the
question to the state board. The Supreme Court held that the national
board had exclusive jurisdiction and even though it did not exercise its
power, the state could not intervene. It was also intimated that a state
may act only in the exercise of its police powers and not otherwise.
In Hill v. Florida,325 U. S. 538 (1945), it was held that a portion of
a state statute which required registration and licensing of union representatives before acting in their official capacities was void as in contravention of the Wagner Act. The Court stated that the power of a state
cannot stand "as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the
full purposes and objectives of Congress." 325 U. S. at 542, quoting
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S. 52, 67 (1941). The controversy in
La Crosse Telephone Corp. v. Wisconsin ERB, 336 U. S. 18 (1949),
concerned certification of a bargaining agent. The union petitioned the
state administrative agency for aid and the latter determined the bargaining unit and held elections among the employees. This action was
deemed to be in conflict with the NLRA and exclusively within the jurisdiction of NLRB.
An administrative phase of a state act which controlled maintenance
of membership clauses in collective bargaining agreements was involved
in Algoma Plywood Co. v. Wisconsin ERB, 336 U.S. 301 (1949). The
Supreme Court held that this type of contract was not within the provisions of the LMRA and consequently was subject to regulation by the
state. It is apparent that Congress did not intend to embrace every
possible labor dispute within the Act. It has expressly stated what it
covered: the facts of the Algoma case did not fall within these selfimposed limits.
Police power was exercised in International Union, U.A.W.A. v. Wisconsin ERB, 336 U. S. 245 (1949). The union had called sporadic meetings during working hours without notice as to whether the employees
would return. Twenty-six such meetings were called although no union
purpose was expressed. The Supreme Court held that activity of this
coercive nature was sufficient to invoke thd police efforts of a state. There
was also some evidence of considerable injury to property and intimidation. The Court also held that the Act did not cover what was being done,
however expressly stating that the police power of a state cannot conflict
with federal power in these cases. The conduct must be such that it is
governed by the state or it is not governed at all. In Plankington Packing
Co. v. Wisconsin ERB, 338 U.S. 953 (1950), the Supreme Court again
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reversed the Wisconsin Supreme Court which had rejected a contention
that the Wisconsin Employment Peace Act was in conflict with the
NLRA and had ordered the reinstatement of an employee allegedly discharged for union activity. Though in only a short per curiam opinion,
the Court in citing the LaCrosse and Bethlehem Steel cases, supra, held
that the NLRB had exclusive jurisdiction to order reinstatement of an
employee engaged in interstate commerce whose discharge was an unfair
labor practice.
In Automobile Workers v. O'Brien, 339 U.S. 454 (1950), the Court
held that the Michigan law which contained pre-strike provisions was
void, basing its determination on the fact that the LMRA had preempted the field. It was held that a state has no right to compel a union
to follow its procedure before it may strike. Finally, Association of Bus
Employees v. Wisconsin ERB, 340 U.S. 383 (1951), is pertinent. The
parties involved were unable to agree on wages, hours or working conditions. The petitioners were employed by a public utility. The Wisconsin
Board postponed a strike, obtaining an ex parte order. The Supreme
Court held, notwithstanding the Wisconsin Anti-Strike Act applying to
public utilities, that Congress had given the union a right to strike, and
a state may not take the right away for its own reasons. State public
emergencies will not supersede the federal law.
The lower federal courts have uniformly held that a party to a dispute
falling within the provisions of the Federal Acts has a remedy solely
through the NLRB and that injunctive relief at the insistence of a
private party will not be granted. Amazon Cotton Mill Co. v. Textile
Workers Union, 167 F.2d 183 (4th Cir. 1948); Fitzgeraldv. Douds, 76
F. Supp. 597 (S.D.N.Y. 1948). In the Amazon case the court quoted,
167 F.2d at 187, a committee report on the question of private rights,
the Board's power shall not be affected by other means of adjustment or prevention." The Fitzgeraldcourt stated as to private rights, 76
F. Supp. at 598:
It would be strange indeed if, prior to such time as the Board made any
decision or determination and when it was doing no more than starting a
hearing ... a litigant fearful that the Board might in the end reach a conclusion detrimental to his interests, could hamstring the entire proceeding
by an application to the District Court for an injuction.

Concerning the jurisdictional rights of state courts, the California court
stated in Gerry v. Superior Court, 32 Cal.2d 119, 194 P.2d 689, 694
(1948):
The provisions of the 1947 Act show an intent to preserve the functional
purposes of the National Labor Relations Act with increased objectives, and
an intent not to confer powers on the courts at the suit of plivate parties
with the exception of the jurisdiction expressly granted, which does not
include the exercise of equity powers.

It is submitted that the decision iii the principal case is determinative
of the intent of Congress and dispositive of any question as to the mean-
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ing of prior judicial expressions. Professional opinion as to these issues,
however, has been expressed to the contrary. Hall, The Taft-Hartley
Act v. State Regulation, 1 JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW 97 (1952); Rose,
supra. Especially does the instant decision seem correct when the Board
has been empowered with plenary authority to dispose of the present
controversy. Under these circumstances, to state that Congress intended
to permit this asserted distinction in its labor acts without at least some
expression to that end seems to this writer to be erroneous.
Donald J. Prebenda

TAXATION -DEDUCTIBILITY

OF LOSSES -

WHETHER BUSINESS

OR

NoN-BusINEss BAD DEBTS. -0 . D. Bratton, P-H 1953 TC MEm. DEC.
53,272 (1953). The petitioner had been engaged in the lumber business
all of his life. His interests included holdings in a number of lumber
concerns and in other firms related thereto. He also concerned himself
with buying mills, operating them for a short time and then selling them.
During the course of these activities, the petitioner guaranteed to creditors the debts of the firms in which he held an interest. In 1946 he
organized a corporation to manufacture prefabricated garages. The stock
of this corporation was owned by the petitioner and three others, two of
the latter stockholders subsequently transferring their shares to the
petitioner, giving him a seventy-five per cent interest in the business. The
venture failed to prosper, and the petitioner in 1947 and 1948 advanced
or lent money to the corporation to pay its creditors, such payments
having been guaranteed by him. In December, 1948, the corporation became insolvent and the petitioner deducted these loans, which were
uncollectible, as bad debts. The commissioner disallowed the deduction
and petitioner instituted this action. The Tax Court held that they were
debts incurred in the business of the petitioner and that, therefore, they
were business bad debts.
The issue involved in this case is the construction of INT. REV. CODE

§ 23 (k) which sets out the bad debt deductions that may be taken from
gross income in the computation of taxes. Subsection (k) (1) states that
debts which have become worthless within the taxable year and which
are incurred in the trade or business of the taxpayer are fully deductible.
Section 23(k) (4) refers to non-business bad debts and declares that
debts of this type can only be deducted as a short-term capital loss under
INT. REV. CODE § 117, which allows a maximum deduction of $1,000 in
excess of short-term capital gain. It is obvious, therefore, that it is of
great advantage to the taxpayer to have his losses from bad debts adjusted under § 23(k) (1) where they can be deducted in full rather than
under § 23 (k) (4) where only a partial deduction may be available.
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The first step to be taken in determining whether these debts are
business or non-business bad debts is to consider INT. REv. CODE §
23 (e) in which losses to the individual are divided into three classes. The
two that are pertinent here are 1) losses incurred in the taxpayer's trade
or business; and 2) any transaction entered into for profit. If the loss
due to bad debts falls under the first class, it can be deducted under §
23 (k) (1). If it comes under the second, it is a non-business debt and falls
under § 23 (k) (4). In some instances this is a fine distinction to draw.
U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.23(k)(6) (1953), states: "the question
whether the debt is one the loss from the worthlessness of which is incurred in the taxpayer's trade or business is a question of fact in each
particular case." See also Higgins v. Commissioner, 312 U.S. 212, 217
(19141). In subsection (b) of the same regulation, the service goes on to
say:
The character of the debt... is to be determined rather, by the relation
which the loss resulting from the debt's becoming worthless bears to the
trade or business of the taxpayer. If that relation is a proximate one in the
conduct of the trade or business in which the taxpayer is engaged at the
time the debt becomes worthless, the debt is not a non-business debt for
the purposes of this section.

It is to be noted, therefore, that many factors must be taken into consideration in determining the Atatus of the debt; i.e., whether it is contracted in the trade or business or merely in a venture entered into for
profit, whether the taxpayer is primarily in this business, and most of all,
what the particular facts are in each case.
A consideration of some of the cases on this point might serve to
clarify the problem. In Robert Cluett, 3rd, 8 T.C. 1178 (1947), it was
held that the petitioner who sold a one-fourth interest in a stock exchange
membership was entitled to a business bad debt deduction when the
buyer became insolvent and could not pay. This was so because the
petitioner was engaged in the investment business and it was held that
the seat was an integral part of that business. In Vincent C. Campbell,
11 T.C. 510 (1948), three brothers owned all the stock in twelve corporations engaged in the coal business. When one of the businesses was
failing they advanced it money and paid off its creditors. When the debts
became uncollectible it was held that they were business bad debts. In
another case, a taxpayer who had interests in several corporations, exploited patents, and lent money to his own and other corporations, was
held to be in the business of exploiting patents and could deduct losses
sustained as business bad debts. Estate of J. Stogdell Stokes, P-H 1951
TC MEI . DEc. [ 51,343 (1951).
A taxpayer engaged in the development of new businesses and promotion of corporations was allowed a business bad debt deduction when he
lost money on a loan made to a corporation in which he had invested.
This was so because it was found that he was a promoter of corporations
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and an organizer of new businesses. Valentine E. Macy, Jr., P-H 1949 TC
MEM. DEC. f 49,009 (1949). In Dan R. Hanna, Jr., P-H 1951 TC MEM.
DEC. 151,180 (1951), the taxpayer was a member of a firm that invested in businesses. He lent the firm money, and his wife also put in some
money. It was held that he was engaged in the trade or business of investing but that his wife was not so engaged and that her loss came
under § 23 (k) (4). Throughout these cases there is the single issue as to
whether the taxpayer was engaged in the trade or business of promoting
or lending to corporations. In all of the aforementioned cases he was
deemed to have been so engaged. That was his primary business, and the
losses stemmed from loans made as an integral part of such business.
On the other hand, there have been numerous decisions disallowing a
claimed deduction under § 23(k) (1) and moving it to § 23(k) (4). So,
for example, in the cases in which corporations are involved, the primary
question is whether the transaction is corporate business or the business
of the individual. If the individual is merely an employee who makes a
loan to the corporation, he is not in the trade or business of making loans
and cannot take a business bad debt deduction. Wallace L. Chesshire,
P-H 1952 TC MEm. DEc.
52,042 (1952); Jan G. J. Boissevain, 17
T.C. 325 (1951); Fred R. Angevine, P.H. 1951 TC MEM. DEC.

1151,319

(1951). Paying corporate debts is the responsibility of the corporation
and not of the employee. William A. Bagley, P-H 1951 TC MEM. DEC.
f[ 51,308 (1951). The taxpayer has the burden of proving that he is
engaged in the business of making the loans, and if he fails to carry ihis
burden, the losses will be adjudged non-business bad debts, Harold
Kushel, 15 T.C. 958 (1950).
The federal appellate courts have also had their turn to bandy about
the question of whether or not an individual was engaged in a certain
trade or business. Although these cases are decided under § 23(e), as
was stated above, this section is the starting point whence comes the
determination as to whether the bad debt falls under § 23(k) (1) or §
23 (k) (4). One of the earliest cases on the subject, Washburn v. Commissioner, 51 F.2d 949 (8th Cir. 1931), held that where a retired lawyer
had for years given personal attention to and participated in the management of various companies and enterprises in which he had investments, not for the purpose of merely conserving them, but of carrying
them on successfully and making them profitable, he was engaged in the
business of promoting, and his losses on the sale of stock in one of the
companies resulted in a loss deductible as one incurred in the trade or
business. In Dalton v. Bowers, 287 U.S. 404 (1932), the taxpayer was
an inventor and formed a corporation to market his products. He always
considered himself apart from the corporation and always thought of the
latter as a distinct entity. The court held that he was-not regularly engaged in the business of buying and selling corporate stocks and bonds
but was an investor and thus could not take a business loss deduction on
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the amount paid for the insolvent corporation's capital stock. The taxpayer in Burnet v. Clark, 287 U.S. 410 (1932), was the chief stockholder
of a dredging company and was a member of three other firms engaged
in a similar business. As president he conducted the operations of the
company in which he had a majority holding. The court held that he was
engaged in the business of dredging and that loans he made to the firm
were the result of an isolated or occasional transaction and were only
losses sustained in transactions entered into for profit (§ 23 (e) (2)) and
not from the operation of a trade or business. As in the tax courts, these
courts are searching for the business of the taxpayer, and whether the
debts are an incident thereof is the question to be decided.
The most recent case is Commissioner v. Smith, 203 F.2d 310 (2d.
Cir. 1953), reversing, 17 T.C. 135 (1951). Smith, who was general manager of a large department store, invested in a large number of business
enterprises. One of his ventures, that of managing a small farm, failed,
and he lost about $38,000 which he had lent to the firm while its finances
were in a declining state. The petitioner claimed this loss to be a business
bad debt, stating that he was in the business of investing and promoting
though not in the business of lending money. The court of appeals, overruled the Tax Court and held that the full time management of one's
investments does not constitute a trade or business. Therefore, the loss
was a non-business bad debt.
The courts still seem to be in a quandary as to what constitutes a trade
or business: Whether they require that the individual must be engaged
solely in helping, working with, and investing in one type of business
only, or whether he must be a "promoter," investing generally in many
businesses has not been definitely decided. The courts have sustained
and rejected both arguments. Vincent C. Campbell; Burnet v. Clark;
Washburn v. Commissioner;Commissioner v. Smith, supra.
Turning to the principal case, it is evident that Bratton should be
allowed a business bad debt. Lumber had always been his foremost interest; he managed mills and invested in them. He bought and sold lumber
mills and guaranteed all of these investments with his own personal
credit. For all practical purposes he was the corporation, and those dealing with him considered him as such. Certainly he was engaged in the
business of prolmoting lumber businesses. It is reasonable, therefore, that
such business bad debts should be allowed. Howerer, it must be born in
mind that the only general rule in these, and subsequent cases, is that the
matter of business or non-business bad debts is a question of fact that
must be decided in each particular case.
Donald W. Bebenek
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TAXATION GIFTS SUBJECT TO TAXATION CONSIDERATION REMOVES TRANSACTION FROm GIFT TAX. - Rosenthal v. Commissioner,

205 F.2d 505 (2d Cir. 1953). The petitioner brought this action before

the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit on a petition
for review of a gift tax deficiency determined by the Tax Court with
respect to certain obligations undertaken by him towards his daughters
in 1946.
In a separation agreement made on July 26, 1944, between taxpayer
and his wife, he agreed to pay an amount stipulated to be $499,340.98
for the education, care, and support of his two daughters. Both daughters
were minors at the time the agreement was first entered into, one being
twenty years old and the younger daughter fourteen. On December 18,
1944, the taxpayer's wife obtained a divorce and the agreement made
earlier was made part of the divorce decree. This agreement was superseded in 1946 by a new agreement whereby the obligations of the
petitioner were revalued at $729,737.67. The later agreement was made
contingent upon the amendment of the divorce decree so that it would
become a part thereof. No gift tax was paid on the gifts given in 1944
because at the time both children were minors, the older becoming
twenty-one on May 14, 1945.
A tax of $160,212.00 was paid on the new agreement to establish
trusts, and the Commissioner assessed a deficiency of $39,848.36 for
undervaluation of future annual payments. In a review before the Tax
Court, 17 T.C. 1047 (1951), the deficiency owed by the taxpayer was set
at $23,194.37 for the 1944 agreement for his wife's support and $16,983.17 on the agreement made in 1946. Only the assessment on the 1946
agreement was appealed, but a refund was sought for the amount already
paid on the 1946 agreement. The refund was claimed because the 1946
agreement was made for a full and adequate consideration in money or
money's worth, and the taxpayer also maintained that the payments
were not gifts because they were made in discharge of a decretal obligation. The Tax Court was reversed, the court agreeing with the petitioner
in regard to his first contention but the second contention was decided
against the petitioner, the court saying, 205 F.2d at 508: "We . . .
conclude . . . decretal obligations do not obtain exemption from the

federal gift tax by simply receiving the court's imprimatur."
The questions as to whether later agreements, such as that made in
1946 here, are bona fide arm's length transactions made without donative
intent and thus made for a full and adequate consideration, and whether
the contingency of acceptance and adoption in divorce decrees exempt
like payments as a discharge of a decretal obligation.
The word "gift" for the purposes of the gift tax is any voluntary
transfer of property made in the absence of consideration or compensation of any kind. Commissioner v. Montague, 126 F.2d 948, 951 (6tl
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Cir. 1942). The gift tax is imposed only when the donor has lost all
economic control over the property that is subject to the tax. Estate of
Bartman, 10 T.C. 1073, 1078 (1948). If property given in trust is controlled by the grantor or in any way subject to his dominion and control,
it is not a gift, but is still the property of the person who has control over
it. Lester v. United States, 35 F. Supp. 535, 540 (Ct. Cl. 1940).
Transfers for the benefit of spouse or children that are made pursuant
to divorce decrees are not generally held to be gifts within the meaning
of the gift tax unless they are in excess of the obligation of support.
Entirely apart from the consideration question, any transfer that is
compelled by law is not a proper subject of gift taxation. Pedrick, The
Gift Tax Jurisdictionof the Divorce Court, 46 ILL. L. Rxv. 177 (1951).
If the parties had agreed to make the gift voluntarily, the gift tax would
be imposed because the transfer would have been a voluntary transaction. When it is made in contemplation of an ensuing divorce decree,
however, the complexion of the transaction changes, for in such a situation the divorce court would make such a settlement regardless of the
parties' intentions so that such a "gift" is not voluntary. Harris v. Commissioner, 340 U.S. 106 (1950).
In the case of McMurtry v. Commissioner, 203 F.2d 659 (1st Cir.
1953), the petitioner agreed to a property settlement with his wife, but
the settlement was not to become effective until the divorce court
adopted the agreement. The court held that the payments made were
attributable to the divorce decree and not made because of the voluntary
consent of the parties so that they were not properly gifts.
The court in Commissioner v. Converse, 163 F.2d 131 (2d Cir. 1949),
held that a gift tax should not be imposed on transfers made pursuant to
a divorce decree. An agreement was reached between petitioner and his
wife during the course of the trial for a property settlement which was
made a part of the divorce decree. The Commissioner sought to tax this
as a gift but the petitioner claimed that the payments were in discharge
of a decretal obligation and therefore not properly a gift. The court said
that this was a debt imposed against the petitioner by law and could be
collected against the estate; therefore it was a liquidated debt instead
of a gift. Discharge of this debt imposed by law was an adequate and
full consideration in money or money's worth and not taxable.
The bare fact that an agreement is incorporated or made in contemplation of an ensuing divorce decree is not sufficient in and of itself to re
move all transactions from the classification of gifts. The petitioner, in
Hooker v. Commissioner, 174 F.2d 863 (5th Cir. 1949), agreed to a
property settlement with his wife which was made a part of the decree.
Included in the agreement were certain payments to be made to the
children. The court held that no tax should be assessed on the obligations to the children except those payments that were in excess of the
obligation of support.
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Payments made in discharge of decretal obligations then, are not subject to the imposition of a gift tax. This is true whether the obligation of
payment is originally imposed by the court itself or whether the court
agrees to incorporate a previous agreement of the parties, because the
source of the payments is the divorce decree itself, and not the agreement. In Harris v. Commissioner, supra, because the agreement made
between the parties was to survive the divorce decree, the circuit court,
178 F.2d 861 (2d Cir. 1949), held the contract as well as the decree to be
the foundation of payments, which were therefore taxable. But the
Supreme Court in reversing this stand stated that the source of the rights
is the divorce decree; the source of the rights, not the manner in which
they are enforced, will control in determining whether the transfer is a
gift or not, 340 U.S. at 111. The transfer was held not to be a taxable
gift.
This limitation of the law on the obligation of support is a necessary
restriction on the amount paid under divorce decrees. Otherwise, as
pointed out by Pedrick, supra at 186, the mere fact of incorporation into
a divorce decree of any type of agreement to transfer would give this
transfer an aura of immunity, and allow taxfree transfer of any amount.
Since "support" is such a tenuous thing and varies with each case, the
amount paid for support should be determined by the Commissioner.
The value of consideration must then be determined, as the payments
made Which were greater than those necessary for support will be taxable
unless there is an adequate and full consideration in money or money's

worth. INT.

REV. CODE § 1002.

A gift is a gratuity, and as such it does not require consideration. In
fact there can be none under the Code, for if there is consideration for
the transfer of the property it is not properly a gift. Commissioner v.
Montague, supra, 126 F.2d at 951. When property is transfered for less
than an adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth, the
amount which is not supported by consideration is deemed to be a gift.
This does not include transfers that are made in the ordinary course of
business. Thus if the transaction is bona fide at arm's length and free
from any donative intent, it is considered to be made for an adequate and
full consideration in money or money's worth. In addition there are certain values that are not reducible to monetary terms at all, such as love,
affection, and marriage promises. These are not recognized in gift tax
law as constituting any consideration whatever in fixing the value of the
taxable gift. U.S. Treas. Reg. 108, § 86.8 (1943).
As can be seen above, consideration within the contemplation of the
gift tax is not the same as that determined by the common law. Mutual
promises are insufficient to satisfy the notion of consideration, unless
there is an exchange of equivalent values in money or money's worth in
something that is reducible to a money value. Commissioner v. Bristol,
121 F.2d 129, 133 (lst Cir. 1941).
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In Commissioner v. Greene, 119 F.2d 383 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 314
U.S. 641 (1941), the payments were made by one Alice Lester, who was
mentally incompetent, for the support of her two daughters. The daughters were adults, were accustomed to a life of ease and were unable to
take care of themselves. By California law they were classified as
indigents whose support must be provided for by members of the family.
The defendant claimed that under these circumstances no gift tax should
be assessed. The court held, however, that this was not sufficient consideration for federal gift tax purposes since such consideration is not
determined by state law. The gift tax was intended to reach all transfers
that are donative, and consideration that is not reducible to a money
value is ineffective.
Originally, the test as to whether a transaction was or was not a gift
was the presence or absence of donative intent. This has been replaced
however with the test of money or money's worth, and under the rigid
requirements of this new rule, there must be an exchange of equal values
or the transaction will be subject to a gift tax. Commissionerv. Wemyss,
324 U.S. 303 (1945).
Love and affection, as seen above, is insufficient to constitute consideration in any way. In Housman v. Commissioner, 105 F.2d 973 (2d
Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 309 U.S. 656 (1939), the court held that there
was no contract when the plaintiff agreed to give certain amounts of
money to her son in exchange for his promise not to contest the validity
of his deceased father's will. The possibility of success in the threatened
suit by the son was so remote that it could not be deemed adequate consideration. The actual motivation seemed to be the close kinship between
the two, and this is not valid consideration.
A moral obligation is also insufficient to remove the transaction from
the purview of the gift tax. In Lester v. United States, supra, the plaintiff promised his wife that he would make payments to their daughters
out of the money that the wife intended to bequeath to him at her death.
He contended that the money was left to him in trust, and paid by him
as trustees to his daughters out of natural love and affection. Although
this may have imposed a moral obligation on the plaintiff, it did not give
rise to any legal obligation. Therefore the court held that the transaction
could not be termed as anything but a taxable gift.
The court in the instant case did not settle the issue as to whether
the tax could be assessed on the 1944 .agreement, but it left the Commissioner the opportunity to raise the issue in the Tax Court since the
case was remanded for reassessment.
The court did, however, decide that since the payments to the daughters under the 1946 agreement were made in discharge of a decretal
obligation, they should be immune to taxation in so far as they were
necessary for the support of the daughters. Further, since these transfers
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under the 1946 agreement were supported by the relinquishment of rights
contained in the 1944 agreement there was an adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth and a tax could be assessed only
on the difference between the money given under the 1946 agreement
and the money surrendered under the 1944 agreement.
This seems to be the only conclusion that could be arrived at in view
of the surrender of the rights obtained pursuant to the 1944 agreement
in exchange for the 1946 promise. The limitation on tax free transfers
pursuant to divorce decrees also seems to be the logical remedy to circumvent an attempt to make a tax free transfer simply by having it incorporated in a divorce decree.
Michael C.Dionise

WORKMAN'S COMPENSATION

-

CoURsE OF EMPLOYMENT" -

SPORTS

Tedesco v. General
Electric Co.. ....
N
.....
, 114 N.E.2d 33 (1953). The New York Workmen's Compensation Board made an award to claimant for the compound
fracture of his left ankle, injured while he was playing under the auspices
of the General Electric Athletic Association. Membership in this association was limited to employees of the General Electric Company working
at the Schenectady, N.Y. plant. On these facts the compensation board
found that the injuries arose "out of and in the course of his employment." This finding was rejected by the lower court, 276 App. Div. 422,
95 N.Y.S.2d 505 (3d Dep't 1950), but upheld by the New York Court
of Appeals which relied heavily on the fact that the athletic association
was an independent organization in name only, in that the General Electric Company allowed them rent-free usage of a club house located on
company owned grounds, as well as free advertising in the company
newspaper, and gave them donations of over $55,277 during the years
1939 through 1947. In addition, it was also found that the employer had
closed down the operations of the club house and other facilities during
a company strike.
-

SOFTBALL PLAYERS AND STATUTORY COVERAGE. -

The problem before the court, and to be considered herein, is whether
or not, under these and similar facts dealing with injuries incurred in
athletic activities connected with an employer, the plaintiff was injured
while "in the course of his employment." The court was of the opinion
that there was sufficient "employer dominance and benefit" to justify its
holding that the injured employee was within the "course of his employment" when hurt.
In the principal case and cases to be cited infra, the employees were
not paid any additional salary to play ball, but were playing incidentally
to their usual employment. This is an indication that the particular
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factual situation, as well as matters of broad social policy, are considerations the courts use in construing the phrase "arising out of and in the
course of employment" found in inany workmen's compensation acts.
Many of the cases dealing with injuries incurred during athletic activities emanate from New York State. In Holst v. New York Stock Exchange, 252 App. Div. 233, 299 N.Y. Supp. 255 (3d Dep't 1937), the
plaintiff, a page for the exchange, was injured while playing after work
on a soccer team maintained by the company. The Appellate Division
allowed recovery on the theory that the company ran a business in encouraging and sponsoring baseball, soccer and hockey teams, allowing
time off from work to practice, and paying for any deficits incurred.
This court, a year later, again took a liberal view in Huber v. Eagle
Stationery Corp., 254 App. Div. 788, 4 N.Y.S.2d 272 (3d Dep't 1938),
allowing recovery when the decedent died as a result of being hit on the
head by a ball while playing in a league game in which the employer had
paid the team's entrance fee and furnished uniforms bearing the company's name.
The Appellate Division, however, refused recovery in Donnelly v.
Smithtown, 260 App. Div. 819, 22 N.Y.S.2d 332 (3d Dep't 1940), when
a police chief was injured in a game of softball while waiting for a fellow
trooper. Though this same court granted recovery in Wilson v. General
Motors Corp., 272 App. Div. 845, 70 N.Y.S.2d 109 (3d Dep't 1947), it
was later reversed, 298 N.Y. 468, 84 N.E.2d 781 (1949). In this case
the claimant was injured while playing softball in a league organized by
the employees themselves, and while playing on his own time many miles
from the place of employment. In the principal case the Wilson decision
was distinguished on its facts and recovery was allowed.
The New Jersey rule, as distinguished from the New York rule, is
more conservative and refuses to allow awards in such cases. In Porowski
v. American Can Co., 15 N.J. Misc. 316, 191 Atl. 296 (Workmen's
Comp. Bureau, Dep't Labor 1937), recovery was denied to an employee
hurt while playing softball after working hours. The court reasoned that
since the plaintiff was not supplied uniforms and since no benefit accrued
to the employer because of this activity, the injured party had failed to
meet the burden of showing that he was "in the course of employment"
when hurt. This conservative view was affirmed in Padula v. Royal
Plating & Polishing Co., 14 N.J. Super. 603, 82 A.2d 225 (L. 1951),
even though it was shown that the plaintiff was hurt while playing in a
company league game and while wearing a company uniform. The court
found no basis for application of a "mutual benefit" theory of recovery,
in accordance with the earlier case of Leventhal v. Wright Aeronautical
Corp., 25 N.J. Misc. 154, 51 A.2d 237 (Workmen's Comp. Bureau, Dep't
Labor 1946), where under similar facts recovery was denied.
As between the New Jersey rule and the New York rule, the latter
appears to be the majority view, that is, if there is a majority. LeBar v.
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Ewald Bros. Dairy, 217 Minn. 16, 13 N.W.2d 729 (1944); Ott v. Industrial Comm'n, 83 Ohio App. 13, 82 N.E.2d 137 (1948).
A variation of this problem is the employee-ballplayer who is injured
while enroute either to or from a game. Again a question of coverage by
the compensation acts is involved. In such a case, the courts have denied
recovery altogether. In Auerbach Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 113 Utah
347, 195 P.2d 245 (1948), the claimant, a cashier, was injured while
traveling to play basketball on a company sponsored team. The court
refused recovery on the ground that "no control" was exercised over the
player in the absence of an express requirement in the employment agreement to play ball. In Industrial Comm'n v. Murphy, 102 Colo. 59, 76
P.2d 741 (1938), the company, upon the request of a few employees,
permitted the formation of a baseball team using the company name on
its uniforms. The plaintiff, a ball player, was injured in a borrowed car
of his employer when returning from a game. The court, while admitting
the athletic activity was a settled custom and a good morale raiser, concluded that there was "no reasonable theory" on which recovery could
be sustained. Accord, Pate v. Plymouth Mfg. Co., 198 S.C. 159, 17
S.E.2d 146 (1941).
Still another variation is the problem of the employee hurt while
engaging in recreational activity during his lunch period. Recovery by
the injured player seems to depend on a theory of employer control or
benefit. There is a definite split of authority on this problem. In Ryan v.
State Industrial Comm'n, 128 Okla. 25, 261 Pac. 181 (1927), the plaintiff lost an eye while playing "catch" with fellow employees during his
lunch hour. It was admitted under cross-examination that the company
sponsored a baseball team though it did not directly support it, and that
the injured employee was hired principally for his baseball ability. The
court denied recovery under the compensation act holding that the
casual connection between the conditions of employment and injury was
lacking in that the employer received no benefit from the activity. Accord,
Theberge v. Public Service Electric & Gas Co., 25 N.J. Misc. 149, 51
A.2d 248 (Workmen's Comp. Bureau, Dep't Labor 1947).
In Luteran v. Ford Motor Co., 313 Mich. 487, 21 N.W.2d 825 (1946),
an employee was struck by a baseball bat during his lunch period after it
slipped from the hands of a batter. Recovery was denied under the "no
benefit to employer" theory when the court found the plaintiff to be a
"spectator standing in dangerous proximity to another employee swinging
a bat." On similar facts, however, recovery was granted in Conklin v.
Kansas City Public Service Co., 226 Mo. App. 309, 41 S.W.2d 608
(1931), the court reasoning that the injury was sustained as an incident
to employment, for by permitting softball, the employer raised the morale
of his employees and thereby achieved a benefit in efficiency. Accord,
Geary v. Anaconda Copper Mining Co., 120 Mont. 485, 188 P.2d 185
(1947).

